Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?
As each new round of multilateral trade
negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating
rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral)
liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, and
desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted.
A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of
negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring
those who have already undertaken liberalization.
Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of
those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead
establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of
negotiations, which creates an ex-ante assurance that any
unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next
round. Such a rule would help induce, or enhance
liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds,
by reducing the gains from retaining protection as
negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to
deeper levels of multilateral liberalization, and induce
other countries to go further than they would in the absence
of a rule. Most important, such an ex-ante rule would not
rely on altruism to be generally acceptable.
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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: |
Mattoo, Aaditya,
Olarreaga, Marcelo |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2000-06
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Subjects: | AGRICULTURE,
APPLIED TARIFF,
ASSURANCE,
AVERAGE TARIFF,
AVERAGE TARIFFS,
CURRENCY,
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY,
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE,
EQUILIBRIUM,
EXPECTED VALUE,
EXTERNALITY,
GATT,
HIGH TARIFFS,
IMPORTS,
INTERNALIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
MARKET ACCESS,
MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION,
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS,
MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION,
MULTILATERAL TRADE,
MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION,
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES,
OPENNESS,
RATES,
RATES OF PROTECTION,
RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS,
RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION,
RECIPROCITY,
REDUCTION IN TARIFFS,
TARIFF BARRIERS,
TARIFF CONCESSIONS,
TARIFF REDUCTIONS,
TARIFF SCHEDULE,
TERMS OF TRADE,
TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS,
TERMS OF TRADE LOSS,
TRADE EFFECT,
TRADE EFFECTS,
TRADE LIBERALIZATION,
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
TRADE POLICY,
UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION,
UNILATERAL REDUCTION,
UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION,
UNILATERAL TRADE,
UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION,
URUGUAY ROUND,
VOLUME OF TRADE,
WORLD PRICES,
WORLD TRADE,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
WTO,
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437087/credit-given-autonomous-liberalization-multilateral-trade-negotiations
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19829
|
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