Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?
As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex-ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce, or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds, by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization, and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex-ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable.
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dig-okr-10986198292024-08-08T18:11:02Z Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? Mattoo, Aaditya Olarreaga, Marcelo AGRICULTURE APPLIED TARIFF ASSURANCE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS CURRENCY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITY GATT HIGH TARIFFS IMPORTS INTERNALIZATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARKET ACCESS MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION MULTILATERAL TRADE MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OPENNESS RATES RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION RECIPROCITY REDUCTION IN TARIFFS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CONCESSIONS TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF SCHEDULE TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE LOSS TRADE EFFECT TRADE EFFECTS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNILATERAL REDUCTION UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION UNILATERAL TRADE UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND VOLUME OF TRADE WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex-ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce, or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds, by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization, and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex-ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. 2014-08-28T18:17:19Z 2014-08-28T18:17:19Z 2000-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437087/credit-given-autonomous-liberalization-multilateral-trade-negotiations https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19829 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2374 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English en_US |
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AGRICULTURE APPLIED TARIFF ASSURANCE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS CURRENCY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITY GATT HIGH TARIFFS IMPORTS INTERNALIZATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARKET ACCESS MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION MULTILATERAL TRADE MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OPENNESS RATES RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION RECIPROCITY REDUCTION IN TARIFFS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CONCESSIONS TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF SCHEDULE TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE LOSS TRADE EFFECT TRADE EFFECTS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNILATERAL REDUCTION UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION UNILATERAL TRADE UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND VOLUME OF TRADE WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AGRICULTURE APPLIED TARIFF ASSURANCE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS CURRENCY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITY GATT HIGH TARIFFS IMPORTS INTERNALIZATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARKET ACCESS MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION MULTILATERAL TRADE MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OPENNESS RATES RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION RECIPROCITY REDUCTION IN TARIFFS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CONCESSIONS TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF SCHEDULE TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE LOSS TRADE EFFECT TRADE EFFECTS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNILATERAL REDUCTION UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION UNILATERAL TRADE UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND VOLUME OF TRADE WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURE APPLIED TARIFF ASSURANCE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS CURRENCY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITY GATT HIGH TARIFFS IMPORTS INTERNALIZATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARKET ACCESS MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION MULTILATERAL TRADE MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OPENNESS RATES RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION RECIPROCITY REDUCTION IN TARIFFS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CONCESSIONS TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF SCHEDULE TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE LOSS TRADE EFFECT TRADE EFFECTS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNILATERAL REDUCTION UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION UNILATERAL TRADE UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND VOLUME OF TRADE WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AGRICULTURE APPLIED TARIFF ASSURANCE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS CURRENCY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITY GATT HIGH TARIFFS IMPORTS INTERNALIZATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARKET ACCESS MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION MULTILATERAL TRADE MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OPENNESS RATES RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION RECIPROCITY REDUCTION IN TARIFFS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CONCESSIONS TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF SCHEDULE TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE LOSS TRADE EFFECT TRADE EFFECTS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNILATERAL REDUCTION UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION UNILATERAL TRADE UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND VOLUME OF TRADE WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS Mattoo, Aaditya Olarreaga, Marcelo Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| description |
As each new round of multilateral trade
negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating
rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral)
liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, and
desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted.
A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of
negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring
those who have already undertaken liberalization.
Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of
those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead
establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of
negotiations, which creates an ex-ante assurance that any
unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next
round. Such a rule would help induce, or enhance
liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds,
by reducing the gains from retaining protection as
negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to
deeper levels of multilateral liberalization, and induce
other countries to go further than they would in the absence
of a rule. Most important, such an ex-ante rule would not
rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. |
| topic_facet |
AGRICULTURE APPLIED TARIFF ASSURANCE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFFS CURRENCY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPECTED VALUE EXTERNALITY GATT HIGH TARIFFS IMPORTS INTERNALIZATION INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARKET ACCESS MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MULTILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION MULTILATERAL TRADE MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OPENNESS RATES RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS RECIPROCAL TARIFF REDUCTION RECIPROCITY REDUCTION IN TARIFFS TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CONCESSIONS TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF SCHEDULE TERMS OF TRADE TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS TERMS OF TRADE LOSS TRADE EFFECT TRADE EFFECTS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION UNILATERAL REDUCTION UNILATERAL TARIFF REDUCTION UNILATERAL TRADE UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION URUGUAY ROUND VOLUME OF TRADE WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS |
| author |
Mattoo, Aaditya Olarreaga, Marcelo |
| author_facet |
Mattoo, Aaditya Olarreaga, Marcelo |
| author_sort |
Mattoo, Aaditya |
| title |
Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_short |
Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_full |
Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_fullStr |
Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations? |
| title_sort |
should credit be given for autonomous liberalization in multilateral trade negotiations? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2000-06 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/06/437087/credit-given-autonomous-liberalization-multilateral-trade-negotiations https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19829 |
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AT mattooaaditya shouldcreditbegivenforautonomousliberalizationinmultilateraltradenegotiations AT olarreagamarcelo shouldcreditbegivenforautonomousliberalizationinmultilateraltradenegotiations |
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