A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the reflective epistemic agency
Abstract: This paper aims to discuss one specific feature of Sosa’s performance epistemology, which is what we call Reflective Epistemic Agency. We argue that Sosa defends a problematic version of epistemic agency on its reflective level. We contrast Sosa’s idea of reflective epistemic agency with Proust’s theory of metacognition to argue that the argument in favor of Reflective Epistemic Agency may lack some empirical plausibility, thus, it should be either revised or abandoned.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia
2021
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| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31732021000600173 |
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| Summary: | Abstract: This paper aims to discuss one specific feature of Sosa’s performance epistemology, which is what we call Reflective Epistemic Agency. We argue that Sosa defends a problematic version of epistemic agency on its reflective level. We contrast Sosa’s idea of reflective epistemic agency with Proust’s theory of metacognition to argue that the argument in favor of Reflective Epistemic Agency may lack some empirical plausibility, thus, it should be either revised or abandoned. |
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