Why do bidders drop out from a sequential auction
In actual sequential auctions, bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and they decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out'', this paper defines a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and characterizes the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Fundação Getúlio Vargas
2001
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| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402001000100002 |
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| Summary: | In actual sequential auctions, bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and they decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "why do bidders drop out'', this paper defines a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and characterizes the equilibria in this model. Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this model. |
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