Governança eleitoral: o modelo brasileiro de justiça eleitoral
This article introduces the debate on electoral governance and examines the main criteria for distinguishing between the different models in comparative terms. The models adopted by various Latin American democracies, highlighting the Brazilian model and its peculiarities will also be discussed in the work. The conclusion is that the prevailing system of electoral governance in Brazil is an atypical combination of elements, such as: concentration of governance activities in a single electoral commission; exclusion of the Legislative Branch from naming and selecting members of the electoral commission and adoption of the "rule of intersection" with the Constitutional Court. This combination creates a favorable institutional climate for the judicialization of partisan political competition, since it allows legal readings of the rules of the competitive game to include interpreting the Constitutional wording.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | Portuguese |
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Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)
2008
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| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582008000400003 |
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| Summary: | This article introduces the debate on electoral governance and examines the main criteria for distinguishing between the different models in comparative terms. The models adopted by various Latin American democracies, highlighting the Brazilian model and its peculiarities will also be discussed in the work. The conclusion is that the prevailing system of electoral governance in Brazil is an atypical combination of elements, such as: concentration of governance activities in a single electoral commission; exclusion of the Legislative Branch from naming and selecting members of the electoral commission and adoption of the "rule of intersection" with the Constitutional Court. This combination creates a favorable institutional climate for the judicialization of partisan political competition, since it allows legal readings of the rules of the competitive game to include interpreting the Constitutional wording. |
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