Duration of Unemployment Benefits and Quality of Post-Unemployment Jobs: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Duration of Unemployment Benefits and Quality of Post-Unemployment Jobs: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

This paper investigates how the potential duration of unemployment benefits affects the quality of post-unemployment jobs. It takes advantage of a natural experiment introduced by a change in Slovenia's unemployment insurance law that substantially reduced the potential benefit duration. Although this reduction strongly increased job finding rates, the quality of the post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected. The paper finds that the law change had no effect on the type of contract (temporary versus permanent), the duration of the post-unemployment job, or the wage earned in the job.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: van Ours, Jan C., Vodopivec, Milan
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-10
Subjects:ACTIVE LABOR, ACTIVE LABOR MARKET, ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAMS, AVERAGE WAGE, BENEFIT ENTITLEMENTS, BUSINESS CYCLE, CASH BENEFITS, COLLUSION, COUNSELING, DEPENDENTS, DISABILITY, ELASTICITY, ELIGIBILITY, EMPLOYMENT OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT OFFICES, EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, ENTITLEMENT, FORMAL SECTOR WORKERS, HUMAN CAPITAL, INCENTIVE EFFECTS, INCOME SUPPORT, INFORMATION, JOB, JOB DURATION, JOB MATCH, JOB MATCHES, JOB OFFERS, JOB SEARCH, JOB SEPARATION, JOB TENURE, JOB VACANCIES, JOB-SEARCH ASSISTANCE, JOBS, LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS, MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY, MORAL HAZARD, OCCUPATION, OLDER WOMEN, OLDER WORKERS, PAYING JOBS, PERMANENT JOB, PERMANENT JOBS, POSITIVE EFFECTS, PREVIOUS WAGE, PREVIOUS WORK, PREVIOUS WORK EXPERIENCE, PREVIOUS WORKING, PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL, RE-EMPLOYMENT BONUSES, SELF-EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, SOCIAL INSURANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY, STABLE JOBS, TEMPORARY JOB, TEMPORARY JOBS, TRAINING COURSES, TRANSITION COUNTRIES, UNEMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED JOB SEEKERS, UNEMPLOYED WORKERS, UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEM, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION, UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM, UNEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL, UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS, VOCATIONAL SCHOOL, WAGE DATA, WAGE GAINS, WAGE LEVEL, WAGES, WORK EXPERIENCE, WORKER, WORKERS, WORKING EXPERIENCE,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/10/7122151/duration-unemployment-benefits-quality-post-unemployment-jobs-evidence-natural-experiment
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9005
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Summary:This paper investigates how the potential duration of unemployment benefits affects the quality of post-unemployment jobs. It takes advantage of a natural experiment introduced by a change in Slovenia's unemployment insurance law that substantially reduced the potential benefit duration. Although this reduction strongly increased job finding rates, the quality of the post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected. The paper finds that the law change had no effect on the type of contract (temporary versus permanent), the duration of the post-unemployment job, or the wage earned in the job.

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