Deposit Insurance Design and Implementation : Policy Lessons from Research and Practice

This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption. It discusses the cross-country differences in design, and synthesizes the policy messages from cross-country empirical work as well as individual country experiences. The paper develops practical lessons from this work and distills the evidence into a set of principles of good design. Cross-country empirical research and individual-country experience confirm that, for at least the time being, officials in many countries would do well to delay the installation of a deposit insurance system.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kane, Edward J., Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Laeven, Luc
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-07
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, ACCOUNTING, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, BANK ASSETS, BANK CAPITAL, BANK DEPOSITS, BANK LENDING, BANK REGULATION, BANK RISK, BANK RUNS, BANK TRANSPARENCY, BANKING CRISES, BANKING CRISIS, BANKING INDUSTRY, BANKING PANICS, BANKING SECTOR, BANKING STABILITY, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKING SYSTEMS, BANKRUPTCY, BANKS, BONDING, BUDGET DEFICITS, CAPITALIZATION, CENTRAL BANK, COINSURANCE, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORRESPONDENT BANKS, DEBT, DEPOSIT GUARANTEES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS, DEPOSITORS, DEPOSITS, DEVELOPMENT BANKS, DISTRESSED BANKS, ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMICS, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE, FINANCIAL CRISES, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, FINANCIAL INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, FINANCIAL SERVICES, FINANCIAL STABILITY, FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES, INCOME GROUPS, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS, INFLATION, INSOLVENCY, INSOLVENT BANKS, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INSURANCE DESIGN, INSURANCE FUNDS, INSURANCE LAW, INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS, INSURANCE SYSTEM, INSURANCE SYSTEMS, INSURED DEPOSITS, INSURERS, INTEREST EXPENSE, INTEREST RATES, LATIN AMERICAN, LEGISLATION, LEVEL PLAYING FIELD, LIQUIDITY, MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION, MARKET DISCIPLINE, MIDDLE EAST, MORAL HAZARD, NONPERFORMING LOANS, NORTH AFRICA, PREMIUMS, PRIVATE BANKS, PRIVATIZATION, PRODUCTIVITY, PROGRAMS, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, REGULATORY FORBEARANCE, RESERVES, RETIREMENT, RISK TAKING, SAVINGS, SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, STATE BANKS, STOCK PRICES, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK, TIME DEPOSITS, VOLATILITY,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/07/6934849/deposit-insurance-design-implementation-policy-lessons-research-practice
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8376
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Summary:This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption. It discusses the cross-country differences in design, and synthesizes the policy messages from cross-country empirical work as well as individual country experiences. The paper develops practical lessons from this work and distills the evidence into a set of principles of good design. Cross-country empirical research and individual-country experience confirm that, for at least the time being, officials in many countries would do well to delay the installation of a deposit insurance system.