WTO Safeguards and Trade Liberalization : Lessons from the Argentine Footwear Case

The footwear case provides an example of the complexities of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on the use of safeguards, and of the interaction of multilateral and regional processes of liberalization. As a result both of Argentina's unilateral liberalization and the removal of barriers within Mercosur, imports of footwear increased rapidly. As Mercosur provides no intra-regional safeguard mechanism, the government of Argentina responded by applying import relief and WTO safeguards against third countries. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body addressed these measures and as a consequence, Argentina dismantled most of them, leading to four main conclusions: The jurisprudence of the WTO's Appellate Body has created serious uncertainty as to when a country can use safeguards. This does not contribute to the political balance that has to be maintained when developing countries implement trade liberalization programs. In fact, it detracts from this crucial goal. It is an error to negotiate ambiguous multilateral agreements on the expectation that the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism will clarify them. An overvalued currency heightened the industry's problems. In the case of footwear, the decline in imports following the recent devaluation was more important than that following the implementation of earlier relief measures. The political economy of liberalization also indicates the need for regional agreements to include adequate transition mechanisms that will facilitate adjustment to free trade and to maintain support for it.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Baracat, Elías, Nogués, Julio J.
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2005-05
Subjects:AD VALOREM, ANTIDUMPING, APPAREL, APPLIED TARIFF, AVERAGE TARIFF, CAPITAL GOODS, CAPITAL INFLOWS, CENTRAL AMERICAN, COMMERCIAL POLICY, COMMON MARKET, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, COMPETITIVE POSITION, COMPETITIVE PRESSURES, CONCESSIONS, CONSUMER PREFERENCES, CURRENCY, DEVALUATION, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, DOMESTIC INDUSTRY, DOMESTIC MARKET, DOMESTIC PRODUCERS, DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ECONOMIC TRENDS, EXPORT PROMOTION, EXPORT TAXES, EXPORTERS, EXPORTING COUNTRIES, EXPORTS, FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES, FOREIGN DEBT, FOREIGN PRODUCERS, FREE TRADE, GDP, GROSS VALUE, IMPACT OF TRADE, IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION, IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD, IMPORT BARRIERS, IMPORT COMPETITION, IMPORT DUTIES, IMPORT RELIEF, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE, LABOR COSTS, LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE, MULTILATERAL RULES, MULTILATERAL TRADE, MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION, MULTINATIONAL FIRMS, OPEN TRADE REGIME, OVERVALUATION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POSITIVE DETERMINATION, PRICE OF IMPORTS, PROTECTION MEASURES, PROVISIONAL MEASURES, QUOTAS, REAL EXCHANGE RATE, REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS, REGIONAL TRADE, REGIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION, SAFEGUARD MEASURE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, SAFEGUARD MECHANISM, SPECIALIZATION, TARIFF CONCESSIONS, TARIFF RATES, TARIFF REDUCTION, TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULE, TARIFF STRUCTURES, TAX RATES, TEXTILE INDUSTRY, TRADE BARRIERS, TRADE DEVELOPMENT, TRADE DIVERSION, TRADE FLOWS, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE POLICY, TRADE PROTECTION, TRADE REFORM, UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION, UNILATERAL TRADE, UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION, VALUE ADDED, VALUE OF IMPORTS, WAGES, WORLD TRADE, ZERO TARIFF,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/5801033/wto-safeguards-trade-liberalization-lessons-argentine-footwear-case
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8246
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Summary:The footwear case provides an example of the complexities of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on the use of safeguards, and of the interaction of multilateral and regional processes of liberalization. As a result both of Argentina's unilateral liberalization and the removal of barriers within Mercosur, imports of footwear increased rapidly. As Mercosur provides no intra-regional safeguard mechanism, the government of Argentina responded by applying import relief and WTO safeguards against third countries. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body addressed these measures and as a consequence, Argentina dismantled most of them, leading to four main conclusions: The jurisprudence of the WTO's Appellate Body has created serious uncertainty as to when a country can use safeguards. This does not contribute to the political balance that has to be maintained when developing countries implement trade liberalization programs. In fact, it detracts from this crucial goal. It is an error to negotiate ambiguous multilateral agreements on the expectation that the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism will clarify them. An overvalued currency heightened the industry's problems. In the case of footwear, the decline in imports following the recent devaluation was more important than that following the implementation of earlier relief measures. The political economy of liberalization also indicates the need for regional agreements to include adequate transition mechanisms that will facilitate adjustment to free trade and to maintain support for it.