Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough

Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Bernard M., Hoekman, Bown, Chad P.
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2007-12
Subjects:	ACCESSION, ADVERSE EFFECT, AGREEMENT ON TRADE, AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES, ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES, ANTIDUMPING, ANTIDUMPING DATABASE, ANTIDUMPING DUTIES, ANTIDUMPING MEASURES, APPELLATE BODY, APPLIED TARIFF, BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS, CASE LAW, CLOTHING INDUSTRY, COMPETITIVENESS, CONCESSIONS, CONSUMER INTERESTS, CONSUMERS, CORE BUSINESS, COUNTERVAILING DUTIES, CUSTOMS, CUSTOMS VALUATION, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPORTS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY MARKET, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, DEVELOPING ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT RULES, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, DOMESTIC COURTS, DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES, DOMESTIC INDUSTRY, DOMESTIC MARKET, DOMESTIC PRODUCERS, DOMESTIC REFORM, DUMPING, ECONOMIC COSTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, ECONOMIC LAW, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMIC WELFARE, ECONOMICS LITERATURE, EUROPEAN UNION, EXPORT MARKET, EXPORT MARKETS, EXPORTING COUNTRY, EXPORTS, EXTERNALITIES, EXTERNALITY, FOREIGN COMPETITION, FOREIGN COUNTRY, FOREIGN EXPORTERS, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, FOREIGN INDUSTRIES, FREE RIDERS, FREE TRADE, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES, IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS, IMPORT COMPETITION, IMPORT MARKETS, IMPORT PENETRATION, IMPORT PROTECTION, IMPORT RESTRICTIONS, IMPORT TARIFFS, IMPORTS OF TEXTILES, INCENTIVE STRUCTURE, INCOME, INCOME GROUP, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, INTERMEDIATE INPUTS, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM, INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE, INVESTMENT TREATIES, LDCS, LEGAL ASSISTANCE, LOW TARIFFS, LOW-INCOME ECONOMIES, MARKET ACCESS, MARKET STRUCTURE, MEMBER COUNTRIES, MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMIES, MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES, MULTILATERAL RULES, MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE, MULTILATERAL TRADE, NATIONAL TRADE REMEDY LAWS, NON-TARIFF BARRIER, OUTSOURCING, OVERHEAD COSTS, PANEL PROCESS, PERFORMANCE DATA, POLICY CHANGE, POLICY CHANGES, POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY REFORMS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL REASONS, POOR COUNTRIES, PORTFOLIO, POSITIVE EXTERNALITY, PREFERENTIAL TRADE, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT, PRODUCTION COSTS, PRODUCTION PROCESS, PROTECTIONISM, RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS, RECIPROCITY, REGIONALISM, REGULATORS, REPUTATION, ROUND AGREEMENT, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, SMALL COUNTRIES, SMALL COUNTRY, TARIFF BINDINGS, TARIFF REDUCTIONS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, TERMS OF TRADE, TRADE AGENDA, TRADE AGREEMENT, TRADE AGREEMENTS, TRADE AREA, TRADE DISPUTE, TRADE DISPUTES, TRADE EFFECTS, TRADE EXTERNALITIES, TRADE INTERESTS, TRADE ISSUES, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION COMMITMENTS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, TRADE OPENNESS, TRADE PERFORMANCE, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE POLICY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM, TRADE PREFERENCES, TRADE REFORM, TRADE REFORMS, TRADE REMEDIES, TRADE REMEDY LAWS, TRADE RESTRICTION, TRADE RESTRICTIONS, TRADE ROUNDS, TRADING PARTNER, TRADING PARTNERS, TRANSITION COUNTRIES, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, TRANSPARENCY, TREATIES, TREATY OBLIGATIONS, TRIPS AGREEMENT, URUGUAY ROUND, VALUATION, VALUE OF TRADE, WAGES, WELFARE GAINS, WORLD ECONOMY, WORLD TRADE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, WTO, WTO AGREEMENTS, WTO COMMITMENTS, WTO MEMBERS, WTO MEMBERSHIP, WTO RULES, WTO SECRETARIAT,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/12/8890051/developing-countries-enforcement-trade-agreements-dispute-settlement-not-enough https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7525
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