Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough
Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization (WTO) trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This article examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce WTO rules and disciplines against small and poor Members, bolstering the transparency function of the WTO is important to make trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. While our focus is on the WTO system, our arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
| Language: | EN |
| Published: |
2008
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| Subjects: | Trade Policy, International Trade Organizations F130, International Law K330, Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy, Factor Movement, Foreign Exchange Policy O240, |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5442 |
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| Summary: | Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization (WTO) trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This article examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce WTO rules and disciplines against small and poor Members, bolstering the transparency function of the WTO is important to make trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. While our focus is on the WTO system, our arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements. |
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