Barriers to Competition in Croatia : The Role of Government Regulation

This paper examines product market policies in Croatia by benchmarking them to OECD countries and highlighting how policies that are more conducive to competition would stimulate a more efficient allocation of resources and, in consequence, facilitate convergence to higher income levels. OECD indicators of overall regulation in product markets indicate that Croatias policies in 2007 were generally more restrictive of competition than were the policies in OECD countries. This is especially true for policies concerned with the degree of state control of the economy and with barriers to entrepreneurship. Regulatory obstacles to trade and foreign direct investment, by contrast, are in line with those of pre-accession European Union countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Poland in 2003, as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 2006), albeit well above the OECD average. Regulation of post, electricity, gas, telecoms, air, rail, and road transport, as estimated by the OECD energy transport and communication sectors indicator, is also less liberal than in the OECD, highlighting the positive knock-on effects for the rest of the economy that could derive from further liberalization of network industries.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: De Rosa, Donato, Madzarevic-Sujster, Sanja, Boromisa, Ana-Maria, Sonje, Velimir
Language:English
Published: 2009-10-01
Subjects:ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION, ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, AIR, AIR FARES, AIR TRANSPORT, AIR TRAVEL, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, BARRIERS TO COMPETITION, BARRIERS TO ENTRY, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, CARRIERS, CODES OF PRACTICE, COMMON MARKET, COMPETITION POLICY, COMPETITIVE ACTIVITIES, COMPETITIVE MARKETS, COMPETITIVE PRESSURE, COMPETITIVE PRODUCT, COMPETITIVENESS, COMPETITORS, COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES, CONSUMER PROTECTION, CONTROL REGULATION, CONTROL REGULATIONS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, DOMESTIC AIRLINES, DOMESTIC COMPETITION, DRIVING, DYNAMIC ECONOMY, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, FARES, FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FINANCIAL SERVICES, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, FOREIGN FIRMS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, FOREIGN INVESTOR, FOREIGN INVESTORS, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, FOREIGN TRADE, FREE TRADE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, FREIGHT, FREIGHT SERVICES, FREIGHT TRANSPORT, GASOLINE, GLOBAL MARKETS, GOVERNMENT POLICY, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS, INCOME, INSURANCE, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF STANDARDS, INTERNATIONAL NORMS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVENTORY, INVESTMENT BARRIERS, INVESTMENT CLIMATE, LAND TRANSPORT, LEGISLATION, LIBERALIZATION, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, MARKET ACCESS, MARKET COMPETITION, MARKET INCENTIVES, MARKET REFORM, MARKET REGULATION, MARKET REGULATIONS, MARKET SHARE, MARKET STRUCTURE, MOBILITY, MOTOR VEHICLES, MUTUAL RECOGNITION, PASSENGER TRANSPORT, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, POLICY GOALS, POLICY INSTRUMENTS, PRICE CONTROL, PRICE CONTROLS, PRICE REGULATION, PRIVATE MARKET, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATIZATION, PRODUCT MARKET, PRODUCT MARKETS, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, PROFESSIONAL BODIES, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, PUBLIC SECTOR, RAIL, RAIL TRANSPORT, RAILROAD, RAILWAY, RAILWAYS, REGULATORS, REGULATORY APPROACHES, REGULATORY AREAS, REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, REGULATORY BODIES, REGULATORY BURDEN, REGULATORY CONTROLS, REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS, REGULATORY GOALS, REGULATORY IMPACT, REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, REGULATORY INTERVENTION, REGULATORY MEASURES, REGULATORY POLICIES, REGULATORY POLICY, REGULATORY PRACTICES, REGULATORY PROCESSES, REGULATORY PROVISIONS, REGULATORY REGIME, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, RETAIL, RETAIL PRICES, RETAIL TRADE, ROAD, ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE, ROAD TRANSPORT, ROUTES, RULES, SAFETY, SAFETY STANDARDS, SALE, SALES, SELF-REGULATION, SINGLE MARKET, STARTUPS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS, TRADABLE PERMITS, TRANSITION COUNTRIES, TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORTATION, TRUE, TURNOVER, TYPE OF REGULATION, VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT, VOLUNTARY CODES, WHOLESALE TRADE, WORKING CAPITAL, WORLD TRADE,
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20091109084001
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/4308
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Summary:This paper examines product market policies in Croatia by benchmarking them to OECD countries and highlighting how policies that are more conducive to competition would stimulate a more efficient allocation of resources and, in consequence, facilitate convergence to higher income levels. OECD indicators of overall regulation in product markets indicate that Croatias policies in 2007 were generally more restrictive of competition than were the policies in OECD countries. This is especially true for policies concerned with the degree of state control of the economy and with barriers to entrepreneurship. Regulatory obstacles to trade and foreign direct investment, by contrast, are in line with those of pre-accession European Union countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Poland in 2003, as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 2006), albeit well above the OECD average. Regulation of post, electricity, gas, telecoms, air, rail, and road transport, as estimated by the OECD energy transport and communication sectors indicator, is also less liberal than in the OECD, highlighting the positive knock-on effects for the rest of the economy that could derive from further liberalization of network industries.