A Few Good Masks : Evidence from Mask Manufacturing in Rwanda during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Did increases in mask supply slow the spread of COVID-19 Rwanda licensed and incentivized textile manufacturers to produce high-quality masks at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper exploits spatial variation in exposure to mask manufacturing through textile trade networks within an event-study design using receipt-level tax data. Licensing domestic mask manufacturers conservatively reduced mask prices by 8.8% and reduced monthly growth in COVID-19 infections (proxied by demand for anti-fever medicine) by 12%. The dynamics of the results suggest that increased mask quality explains reduced infections, in a context where there was strict enforcement of mask mandates and informal markets for masks.
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Working Paper biblioteca |
Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2022-04
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Subjects: | COVID-19, PANDEMIC. INDUSTRY, CORONAVIRUS, MASK MANUFACTURING, MASK QUALITY STUDY, MASK ACCESS STUDY, STRICT MASK ENFORCEMENT DATA, TEXTILE INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO COVID-19, MASK EFFECTIVENESS, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099716204042210015/IDU05c9e060d0a9560467108de80f629ad1a8e0f http://hdl.handle.net/10986/37278 |
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Summary: | Did increases in mask supply slow the
spread of COVID-19 Rwanda licensed and incentivized textile
manufacturers to produce high-quality masks at the start of
the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper exploits spatial variation
in exposure to mask manufacturing through textile trade
networks within an event-study design using receipt-level
tax data. Licensing domestic mask manufacturers
conservatively reduced mask prices by 8.8% and reduced
monthly growth in COVID-19 infections (proxied by demand for
anti-fever medicine) by 12%. The dynamics of the results
suggest that increased mask quality explains reduced
infections, in a context where there was strict enforcement
of mask mandates and informal markets for masks. |
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