Avoiding the Fragility Trap in Africa
Not only do Africa's fragile states grow more slowly than non-fragile states, but they seem to be caught in a "fragility trap". For instance, the probability that a fragile state in 2001 was still fragile in 2009 was 0.95. This paper presents an economic model where three features -- political instability and violence, insecure property rights and unenforceable contracts, and corruption -- conspire to create a slow-growth-poor-governance equilibrium trap into which these fragile states can fall. The analysis shows that, by addressing the three problems, fragile countries can emerge from the fragility trap and enjoy a level of sustained economic growth. But addressing these issues requires resources, which are scarce because external aid is often tailored to the country's performance and cut back when there is instability, insecurity, and corruption. The implication is that, even if aid is seemingly unproductive in these weak-governance environments, it could be hugely beneficial if it is invested in such a way that it helps these countries tackle the root causes of instability, insecurity, and corruption. Empirical estimations corroborate the postulated relationships of the model, supporting the notion that it is possible for African fragile countries to avoid the fragility trap.
Summary: | Not only do Africa's fragile states
grow more slowly than non-fragile states, but they seem to
be caught in a "fragility trap". For instance, the
probability that a fragile state in 2001 was still fragile
in 2009 was 0.95. This paper presents an economic model
where three features -- political instability and violence,
insecure property rights and unenforceable contracts, and
corruption -- conspire to create a
slow-growth-poor-governance equilibrium trap into which
these fragile states can fall. The analysis shows that, by
addressing the three problems, fragile countries can emerge
from the fragility trap and enjoy a level of sustained
economic growth. But addressing these issues requires
resources, which are scarce because external aid is often
tailored to the country's performance and cut back when
there is instability, insecurity, and corruption. The
implication is that, even if aid is seemingly unproductive
in these weak-governance environments, it could be hugely
beneficial if it is invested in such a way that it helps
these countries tackle the root causes of instability,
insecurity, and corruption. Empirical estimations
corroborate the postulated relationships of the model,
supporting the notion that it is possible for African
fragile countries to avoid the fragility trap. |
---|