How Resilient Were Emerging Economies to the Global Crisis?

This paper studies the cross-country incidence of the 2008-2009 global crisis and documents a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging market economies suffered growth collapses comparable, or even larger, to those experienced by advanced economies during the crisis. With such large financial and real shock, most of the world economy came to a halt when the crisis hit, with most countries resuming their pre-crisis growth rates afterwards. While emerging economies were not able to avoid the crisis collapse, they grew at a higher rate during the post crisis, relative to before and, as usual, to advanced countries. Moreover, emerging economies initiated their recovery sooner. Breaking with the past, emerging economies were able to conduct countercyclical policies, and became more similar to developed countries in softening the impact of the crisis and in their ability to pursue expansionary policies.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Didier, Tatiana, Hevia, Constantino, Schmukler, Sergio L.
Format: Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
Published: 2011-04-01
Subjects:ACCESS TO FUNDS, ADVANCED COUNTRIES, ADVANCED ECONOMIES, ASSET PRICES, ASSET VALUES, ASSETS, BALANCE SHEET, BALANCE SHEETS, BANK CLAIMS, BANK LOANS, BANKRUPTCY, BUFFERS, BUSINESS CYCLE, CAPITAL FLOW, CAPITAL FLOWS, CAPITAL INFLOWS, CAPITAL MARKETS, CAPITAL OUTFLOWS, CENTRAL BANK, CENTRAL BANKS, COIN, COMMODITIES, COMMODITY, COMMODITY PRICES, CONSENSUS FORECAST, CONSUMERS, CREDIBILITY, CREDIT RISK, CURRENCY, CURRENCY CRISES, CURRENCY MISMATCHES, CURRENCY VALUE, CURRENT ACCOUNT, CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT, CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS, CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITIONS, DEBT, DECELERATION IN GROWTH, DEPRECIATION, DEPRESSION, DEVALUATION, DEVALUATIONS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, DIRECT INVESTMENT, DOMESTIC BANKING SYSTEM, DOMESTIC CREDIT, DOMESTIC CURRENCIES, DOMESTIC CURRENCY, DOMESTIC ECONOMIES, DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SECTORS, DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN, EMERGING ECONOMIES, EMERGING MARKET, EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES, EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, EMERGING MARKETS, EQUITY MARKETS, EQUITY PRICES, EXCESS RETURN, EXCHANGE RATE, EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS, EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES, EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, EXCHANGE RATE REGIME, EXCHANGE RATES, EXPANSIONARY POLICIES, EXPORT VOLUMES, EXPORTER, EXPORTERS, EXPORTS, EXPOSURE, EXPOSURES, EXTERNAL BALANCE, EXTERNAL POSITIONS, EXTERNAL SHOCK, EXTERNAL SHOCKS, FEDERAL RESERVE, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, FINANCIAL CONTAGION, FINANCIAL CRISES, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL FACTORS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES, FINANCIAL MARKET, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL OPENNESS, FINANCIAL POLICIES, FINANCIAL POLICY, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FINANCIAL SECTORS, FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, FINANCIAL VULNERABILITIES, FINANCIALLY OPEN ECONOMIES, FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS, FISCAL POLICIES, FISCAL POLICY, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES, FORECASTS, FOREIGN ASSET, FOREIGN ASSET POSITION, FOREIGN ASSETS, FOREIGN CAPITAL, FOREIGN CURRENCY, FOREIGN CURRENCY DEBT, FOREIGN DEBT, FOREIGN FINANCING, FOREIGN FUNDS, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, FOREIGN INVESTORS, FOREIGN LIABILITIES, FOREIGN RESERVES, GDP, GDP PER CAPITA, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, GLOBAL DEMAND, GLOBAL EXPORT, GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, GROWTH PROJECTIONS, GROWTH RATE, GROWTH RATES, HEDGE FUNDS, HOUSING FINANCE, ILLIQUID ASSETS, IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES, IMPORTS, INCOME, INCOME GROUPS, INCOME LEVELS, INFLATION, INFLATION TARGETING, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, INSURANCE, INTEREST RATES, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS, INTERNATIONAL RESERVE, INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVENTORIES, INVENTORY, LEADING INDICATORS, LEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY, LOCAL CURRENCY, LONG-TERM ASSETS, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES, MACROECONOMIC POLICY, MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES, MACROECONOMICS, MARKET INTEREST, MARKET RATES, MATURITY MISMATCHES, MONETARY POLICIES, MONETARY POLICY, MONETARY REGIMES, MONEY MARKET, MORAL HAZARD, MORTGAGE, MORTGAGE MARKETS, MUTUAL FUND, MUTUAL FUNDS, OPEN ECONOMIES, OPPORTUNITY COSTS, OUTPUT, PORTFOLIO, PORTFOLIOS, POSITIVE SPILLOVER, POSITIVE SPILLOVER EFFECTS, PRICE OF OIL, PUBLIC DEBT, REAL GDP, REAL SHOCK, RECESSION, RECESSIONS, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, RESERVE ACCUMULATION, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES, RESPONSE TO SHOCKS, SECURITIES, SHORT-TERM DEBT, SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES, STOCK MARKET, STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION, STOCK MARKETS, SYSTEMIC RISK, T-BILLS, TAX, TAX REVENUES, TOTAL DEBT, TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS, TROUGH, UNCERTAINTY, VENTURE CAPITALIST, WAGES, WEALTH, WHOLESALE FUNDS, WHOLESALE MARKET, WORLD ECONOMY,
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110428152332
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3408
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Summary:This paper studies the cross-country incidence of the 2008-2009 global crisis and documents a structural break in the way emerging economies responded to the global shock. Contrary to popular perceptions, emerging market economies suffered growth collapses comparable, or even larger, to those experienced by advanced economies during the crisis. With such large financial and real shock, most of the world economy came to a halt when the crisis hit, with most countries resuming their pre-crisis growth rates afterwards. While emerging economies were not able to avoid the crisis collapse, they grew at a higher rate during the post crisis, relative to before and, as usual, to advanced countries. Moreover, emerging economies initiated their recovery sooner. Breaking with the past, emerging economies were able to conduct countercyclical policies, and became more similar to developed countries in softening the impact of the crisis and in their ability to pursue expansionary policies.