Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes?
Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6 percent more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4 percent more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration.
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
2016-06-09
|
| Subjects: | TAX EVASION, POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, TAX ADMINISTRATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/281521565589273511/Are-Politically-Connected-Firms-More-Likely-to-Evade-Taxes-Evidence-from-Tunisia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32242 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | Are politically connected firms more
likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and
customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former
president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper
demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade
taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6 percent more
likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of
registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4
percent more likely to report anomalously low sales when
submitting a tax declaration. |
|---|