Assessment of Net Mitigation in the Context of International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Mechanisms

This paper discusses the scope for market mechanisms, already established for greenhouse gas mitigation in Annex 1 countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, for implementing "net mitigation," defined here as mitigation beyond Annex 1 countries' formal mitigation requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. Such market mechanisms could be useful for establishing and extending greenhouse gas mitigation targets also under the Paris Agreement from December 2015. Net mitigation is considered in two possible forms: as a "net atmospheric benefit," or as an “own contribution” by offset host countries. A main conclusion is that a “net atmospheric benefit” is possible at least in the short run, best implemented via stricter baselines against which offsets are credited; but it can also take the form of offset discounting whereby offset buyers are credited fewer credits. The latter, although generally inefficient, can be a second-best response to certain imperfections in the offset market, which are discussed in the paper. There is less merit for claiming that "own contributions" can lead to additional mitigation under existing mechanisms.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Strand, Jon
Format: Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2016-03
Subjects:EMISSION ALLOWANCES, ALLOWANCE, EMISSIONS REDUCTION, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, POWER PLANTS, ELECTRICITY SECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, TEMPERATURE, FOSSIL FUELS, EMISSIONS GROWTH, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, EMISSIONS INTENSITY, OFFSET PRICE, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, EMISSIONS LEVELS, EMISSIONS QUOTAS, INCOME, CARBON, MARGINAL COST, VARIABLE COST, DISCOUNT RATE, EMISSIONS, OFFSET PRICES, OFFSET PROJECTS, GLOBAL CARBON MARKET, INCENTIVES, EMISSION REDUCTION, GHGS, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, ENERGY SUBSIDIES, MODELS, GAS, GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS, EMISSION REDUCTION UNITS, EMISSIONS CONTROL, PRICE, ECONOMIC ACTOR, EMISSION REDUCTIONS, AIR, GREENHOUSE GAS, CARBON LEAKAGE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, EMISSIONS ABATEMENT, POLICY RESPONSE, EMISSIONS CONSTRAINTS, CO2, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION, ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS, CLIMATE POLICIES, FEASIBILITY, EMISSION LEVELS, GHG, POLICY APPROACH, GLOBAL EMISSIONS REDUCTION, CLIMATE‐POLICY, FREE ALLOCATION, CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MARKETS, CARBON TAXES, EMISSIONS LEAKAGE, EMISSIONS PRICES, EMISSIONS MITIGATION, EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE, GAS EMISSIONS, FOSSIL‐FUEL, CAPS, ENERGY POLICY, FUELS, CARBON FINANCE, GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL, FINANCE, GREENHOUSE GASES, CAP‐AND‐TRADE POLICY, ET, CARBON EMISSIONS, NATIONAL EMISSIONS, FREE‐ALLOCATION, EMISSIONS BASELINE, GREENHOUSE, EMISSION, CONSUMPTION, CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS, LEAD, POLICIES, CLIMATE‐ POLICY, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, CARBON CREDITS, POLICY MAKERS, CARBON TAX, RESOURCE ECONOMICS, ELECTRICITY, EMISSIONS POLICY, DISCOUNT RATES, EMISSIONS CAPS, CLIMATE, DEMAND, FORESTS, ABATEMENT, LOWER PRICE, GLOBAL EMISSION, HFC‐23, FOSSIL FUEL, HISTORICAL EMISSIONS, OFFSETS DISCOUNTING, CATALYSTS, DOMESTIC EMISSIONS, GLOBAL EMISSIONS, EMISSIONS ALLOCATIONS, MARKET, BASELINE” EMISSIONS, ECONOMIC THEORY, POLICY, CERTIFIED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS, ENERGY PRODUCTION, ALLOWANCES, ENERGY EFFICIENCY, PURCHASES OF OFFSETS, EMISSIONS‐MITIGATION, EMISSIONS TAXES, EMISSIONS TARGETS, LOWER PRICES, COAL, ALLOCATION, ENERGY ECONOMICS, SUPPLY, CARBON MARKET, INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS, INVESTMENTS, PRICE OF OFFSETS, CLIMATE POLICY, OFFSETS, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, RENEWABLE ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL OFFSETS, GASES, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, PRICES, NEGATIVE IMPACTS, BENEFITS, ENERGY,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/03/26050718/assessment-net-mitigation-context-international-greenhouse-gas-emissions-control-mechanisms
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/24137
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Summary:This paper discusses the scope for market mechanisms, already established for greenhouse gas mitigation in Annex 1 countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, for implementing "net mitigation," defined here as mitigation beyond Annex 1 countries' formal mitigation requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. Such market mechanisms could be useful for establishing and extending greenhouse gas mitigation targets also under the Paris Agreement from December 2015. Net mitigation is considered in two possible forms: as a "net atmospheric benefit," or as an “own contribution” by offset host countries. A main conclusion is that a “net atmospheric benefit” is possible at least in the short run, best implemented via stricter baselines against which offsets are credited; but it can also take the form of offset discounting whereby offset buyers are credited fewer credits. The latter, although generally inefficient, can be a second-best response to certain imperfections in the offset market, which are discussed in the paper. There is less merit for claiming that "own contributions" can lead to additional mitigation under existing mechanisms.