Tobacco and Alcohol Excise Taxes for Improving Public Health and Revenue Outcomes

Excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco have long been a dependable and significant revenue source in many countries. More recently, considerable attention has been paid to the way in which such taxes may also be used to attain public health objectives by reducing the consumption of products with adverse health and social impacts. Some have gone further and argued that explicitly earmarking excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to finance public health expenditures—marrying sin and virtue as it were—will make increasing such taxes more politically acceptable and provide the funding needed to increase such expenditures, especially for the poor. The basic idea—tax “bads” and do “good” with the proceeds—is simple and appealing. But designing and implementing good “sin” taxes is a surprisingly complex task. Earmarking revenues from such taxes for health expenditures may also sound good and be a useful selling point for new taxes. However, such earmarking raises difficult issues with respect to budgetary rigidity and political accountability. This note explores these and other issues that lurk beneath the surface of the attractive concept of using increased sin excises on alcohol and tobacco to finance “virtuous” social spending on public health.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bird, Richard M.
Format: Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015-11
Subjects:REGRESSIVE TAXES, TAX LAW, RISKS, EVASION, PRODUCT TAXES, ACCOUNTING, TAX RATES, EXCISE TAXES, PEOPLE, ADDED TAX, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, PUBLIC REVENUES, TAX BURDENS, PSYCHOLOGY, LAWS, TAX CHANGES, SOCIAL RESEARCH, EXCHANGE, SPENDING, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, TAX INCIDENCE, LOCAL FINANCE, SERVICES, TAX BASES, HEALTH CARE, REVENUES, TAX EVASION, SALES TAXES, HEALTH, MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS, TAX SYSTEMS, TAX STRUCTURES, TAX, SIN TAXES, EXCISE TAX, CRIME, TAX RECEIPTS, SMOKERS, TAX REDUCTION, INFLATION, INTERNATIONAL BANK, REVENUE SOURCES, SIN TAX, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, PUBLIC HEALTH, UNIFORM TAXES, KNOWLEDGE, PASSIVE SMOKING, SOCIAL POLICY, TAX SYSTEM, TAX ADMINISTRATION, EXERCISES, TOBACCO TAXES, TAX POLICIES, SMOKING, INTERVENTION, PUBLIC FUNDS, EXTERNALITIES, VALUE ADDED TAX, HEALTH OUTCOMES, MARKETING, USE TAXES, TAX BASE, TAX REFORM, LABOR, TAX REVENUES, PER, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, FINANCE, HEALTH PROMOTION, PUBLIC, TAXES, TAX COMPETITION, HEALTH SPENDING, EXPENDITURE, EARMARKED TAX, ALCOHOL TAXES, EQUITY, ALCOHOL TAXATION, SIN’ TAXES, GOOD, TAX RATE, AGED, TRANSPARENCY, TAX REVENUE, HEALTH POLICY, TAX INCREASES, HEALTH EFFECTS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, STRESS, EXPENDITURES, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, NUTRITION, MARKET, DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION, EARMARKED TAXES, REGULATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, LEVY, MANAGEMENT, TAXATION, WEIGHT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GOODS, EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, CHILDREN, INDIRECT TAXATION, ISOLATION, ADDICTION, TAX POLICY, SIN’ TAX, REVENUE, FAMILIES, GAMBLING, GOVERNMENTS, ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION, IMPLEMENTATION, TOBACCO TAX, ALCOHOLISM,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/11/25485171/tobacco-alcohol-excise-taxes-improving-public-health-revenue-outcomes-marrying-sin-virtue
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/23464
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Summary:Excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco have long been a dependable and significant revenue source in many countries. More recently, considerable attention has been paid to the way in which such taxes may also be used to attain public health objectives by reducing the consumption of products with adverse health and social impacts. Some have gone further and argued that explicitly earmarking excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to finance public health expenditures—marrying sin and virtue as it were—will make increasing such taxes more politically acceptable and provide the funding needed to increase such expenditures, especially for the poor. The basic idea—tax “bads” and do “good” with the proceeds—is simple and appealing. But designing and implementing good “sin” taxes is a surprisingly complex task. Earmarking revenues from such taxes for health expenditures may also sound good and be a useful selling point for new taxes. However, such earmarking raises difficult issues with respect to budgetary rigidity and political accountability. This note explores these and other issues that lurk beneath the surface of the attractive concept of using increased sin excises on alcohol and tobacco to finance “virtuous” social spending on public health.