Electoral Rules and Political Selection

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Beath, Andrew, Christia, Fotini, Egorov, Georgy, Enikolopov, Ruben
Format:	Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2015-07
Subjects:	POLICY ISSUE, COMMUNITIES, FOCUS GROUP, NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, VILLAGES, DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, PARTICIPANTS, POLITICS, CONSULTATION, BRIBES, VILLAGE, BY ELECTION, GOVERNMENT, LEGISLATOR, POLITICAL CAREERS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, POLITICAL THEORY, DATA COLLECTION, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, GAMES, INFORMATION, SERVICES, PARTY COMPETITION, REPRESENTATIVE BODIES, INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC POLICY, LOCAL ELECTIONS, PROJECTS, PROJECT, PARLIAMENT, ELECTORAL SYSTEM, POLICY POSITION, CITIES, CORRUPTION, OVERSIGHT, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, CREDIBILITY, DETAILED INFORMATION, PUBLIC POLICY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, INTERVENTION, RENT, CIVIL SOCIETY, VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE, DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL POWER, CANDIDATES, RESIDENCES, INHABITANTS, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, FIGURES, ACCESS, REPRESENTATIVES, PARLIAMENTS, GRANTS, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL SYSTEM, DESIGN, GRANT, ELECTIONS, CONSTITUENTS, INTERVIEWS, ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, FAIRS, DESCRIPTION, PARTICIPATION, MOBILE PHONE, SURVEY, GENDER, HOMES, CASTING VOTES, POLICY STUDIES, REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS, WORKSHOP, OCCUPATION, HOUSEHOLD, CONSTITUENCY, DECISION MAKING, LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES, OPENNESS, GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION, HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT, HOUSE OF COMMONS, ELIGIBLE VOTERS, SOCIAL WELFARE, POLITICAL PARTIES, DEMOCRACIES, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES, PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, CONSENSUS, VILLAGE LEVEL, HOUSEHOLDS, PARTNERS, ELECTORATE, LOCAL PARTICIPATION, DWELLINGS, FACILITIES, LOCAL LEADERS, HOUSES, INTERVENTIONS, LEGISLATORS, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, PUBLIC SERVICE, GOVERNMENTS, INTERMEDIARIES, POLLING STATION, ELECTION, PUBLIC GOOD, FEMALE, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, DIRECT DEMOCRACY, SERVICE, DISTRICTS, DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, RECONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC GOODS,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24775055/electoral-rules-political-selection-theory-evidence-field-experiment-afghanistan https://hdl.handle.net/10986/22446
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