Public Sector Size and Performance Management : A Case Study of Post-Revolution Tunisia

This paper examines public sector size and performance management in post-revolution Tunisia, drawing on macro-empirical, legal, and qualitative analyses. The paper first shows that public sector employment figures and the wage bill have increased significantly since the 2011 revolution, but that this represents merely an acceleration of the previous trend. The paper then examines de jure and de facto performance management in Tunisia's public sector, covering incentives through recruitment, evaluation, compensation, and promotion. The examination shows that Tunisia's legal framework is well-designed for recruiting the most skilled candidates into the public sector and promoting the most high-performing employees. De facto, the link between an employee's performance and evaluation, compensation, and promotion is weak. Performance evaluation is virtually nonexistent and promotions are automatic or awarded through a process that emphasizes seniority over performance. This is particularly true during the post-revolution period, in which a number of ad-hoc arrangements multiplied divergences between the legal basis for performance management and its application. These ad-hoc changes allowed the state to act as employer of last resort, significantly increasing direct (noncompetitive) recruitment and regularizing temporary staff. The increase in and proliferation of allowances have added to the complexity of the compensation system. In a qualitative review of past reform attempts, the paper demonstrates that reformers had identified the weaknesses of Tunisia's public sector performance system as early as 1989, but failed to achieve major change.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Brockmeyer, Anne, Khatrouch, Maha, Raballand, Gael
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank Group, Washington, DC 2015-01
Subjects:ADVANCEMENT, CAREER, CAREER INCENTIVES, CAREERS, CIVIL SERVICE, COMPENSATION PACKAGES, CONTINUING EDUCATION, DECISION MAKING, DISMISSAL, DISMISSALS, EARLY RETIREMENT, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, EMPLOYEE, EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYMENT INCREASES, EMPLOYMENT POLICIES, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, FUTURE RESEARCH, GRADE INFLATION, HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER_EDUCATION, HIRING, HOUSING, HUMAN RESOURCES, HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, INCOME, INFLATION, JOBS, LABOR FORCE, LABOR MARKETS, LABOR UNION, LABOR UNIONS, LAYOFFS, LITERATURE, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, MINISTRIES OF EDUCATION, MORALE, OPEN ACCESS, PAPERS, PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTOR JOB, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PROFESSIONAL EXAMINATIONS, PROMOTION, PROMOTIONS, PROVISIONS, PUBLIC, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, PUBLIC COMPANIES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC REVENUES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR GROUP, PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS, PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, PUBLIC SECTOR STAFF, PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE, PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE BILL, PUBLIC SECTORS, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY, PUBLIC SERVICES, RECRUITING, RECRUITMENT, REFORM PROGRAMS, RETIREMENT, RETIREMENT PROGRAM, SAFETY NET, SALARY INCREASES, SCHOOLS, SENIORITY, SERVANTS, SERVICE EMPLOYMENT, SERVICE PROVIDER, STAFF, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, STRIKES, TAX, TAX REVENUES, TEACHER, TEACHERS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, TEMPORARY WORKERS, TOTAL WAGE, TRAINING COURSE, TRAINING PROGRAM, TRAINING PROGRAMS, TRANSPARENCY, UNEMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, UNIVERSITY DEGREE, UNIVERSITY GRADUATES, WAGE BILL, WAGE GAP, WAGE NEGOTIATIONS, WORKER, WORKERS, WORKFORCE PLANNING, WORKFORCE REDUCTION,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/01/23179114/public-sector-size-performance-management-case-study-post-revolution-tunisia
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/21145
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Summary:This paper examines public sector size and performance management in post-revolution Tunisia, drawing on macro-empirical, legal, and qualitative analyses. The paper first shows that public sector employment figures and the wage bill have increased significantly since the 2011 revolution, but that this represents merely an acceleration of the previous trend. The paper then examines de jure and de facto performance management in Tunisia's public sector, covering incentives through recruitment, evaluation, compensation, and promotion. The examination shows that Tunisia's legal framework is well-designed for recruiting the most skilled candidates into the public sector and promoting the most high-performing employees. De facto, the link between an employee's performance and evaluation, compensation, and promotion is weak. Performance evaluation is virtually nonexistent and promotions are automatic or awarded through a process that emphasizes seniority over performance. This is particularly true during the post-revolution period, in which a number of ad-hoc arrangements multiplied divergences between the legal basis for performance management and its application. These ad-hoc changes allowed the state to act as employer of last resort, significantly increasing direct (noncompetitive) recruitment and regularizing temporary staff. The increase in and proliferation of allowances have added to the complexity of the compensation system. In a qualitative review of past reform attempts, the paper demonstrates that reformers had identified the weaknesses of Tunisia's public sector performance system as early as 1989, but failed to achieve major change.