Party Age and Party Color : New Results on the Political Economy of Redistribution and Inequality

This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but still contested -- assumption of the political economy literature, left-wing governments redistribute more. In addition, consistent with recent research on the importance of party organization and the organizational differences between younger and older parties, older left-wing parties are more likely to internalize the long-run costs of redistribution and to be more credible in their commitment to redistribution, leading them to redistribute less. With entirely different data, the paper also provides evidence on mechanisms: left-wing governments not only redistribute more, they tax more; older left-wing parties, though, tax less than younger ones.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Keefer, Philip, Milanovic, Branko
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014-12
Subjects:AGGREGATE INEQUALITY, AVERAGE INCOME, BARRIERS TO ENTRY, CASH PROPERTY INCOME, CASH TRANSFERS, COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION, COMMODITY, COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS, COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS, COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS, DATA SET, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEPENDENT VARIABLE, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, DISPOSABLE INCOME, DISPOSABLE INCOMES, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT, DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC REVIEW, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, ECONOMY LITERATURE, EMPIRICAL TEST, EXPORTS, FISCAL POLICIES, FISCAL POLICY, FUTURE RESEARCH, GDP, GINI COEFFICIENT, GROSS INCOME, GROSS INCOMES, HIGH INEQUALITY, HIGHER INEQUALITY, HOUSEHOLD DATA, HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, INCENTIVE EFFECTS, INCOME, INCOME = GROSS, INCOME DATA, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME FLUCTUATIONS, INCOME GROUP, INCOME GROUPS, INCOME INEQUALITY, INCOME QUINTILES, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, INCOME SHARE, INCOME SHARES, INCOME STUDY, INCOME TAX, INCOME TAXATION, INCOME TAXES, INCOME TRANSFERS, INCOMES, INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES, INEQUALITY, INEQUALITY MEASURES, INSURANCE, INVERSE RELATIONSHIP, JOB CREATION, LABOR MARKETS, LABOUR MARKET, LACK OF INFORMATION, LOW INCOME, MACROECONOMICS, MARKET INCOME, MARKET INCOME INEQUALITY, MARKET INCOMES, MARKET SHARE, MEDIAN INCOME, MEDIAN VOTER, MEDIAN VOTER HYPOTHESIS, MIDDLE CLASS, MIDDLE CLASS INCOME SHARE, MIDDLE QUINTILES, NEGATIVE EFFECT, NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP, OLD AGE, OLIGARCHY, OPEN ECONOMIES, PAYROLL TAXES, PENSION, PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS, PENSION INCOME, PENSIONS, PER CAPITA INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME, POLICY DISCUSSIONS, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL REGIME, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICAL UNREST, POOR, POSITIVE EFFECT, POWER PARITY, PRIVATE INVESTMENT, PRIVATE TRANSFERS, PROGRAMS, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC PENSIONS, PUBLIC POLICIES, PUBLIC POLICY, PURCHASING POWER, RANDOM EFFECTS, REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES, REDISTRIBUTION POLICY, REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES, REPUTATION, REPUTATIONS, RURAL, RURAL AREAS, RURAL INHABITANTS, SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES, SIGNIFICANT EFFECT, SOCIAL TRANSFERS, STATE PENSIONS, TAX, TAX REVENUES, TAX STRUCTURE, TAX SYSTEM, TRANSFER PROGRAMS, UNEMPLOYMENT, URBANIZATION, VOTERS, WAGES, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/20464333/party-age-party-color-new-results-political-economy-redistribution-inequality
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/20701
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Summary:This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but still contested -- assumption of the political economy literature, left-wing governments redistribute more. In addition, consistent with recent research on the importance of party organization and the organizational differences between younger and older parties, older left-wing parties are more likely to internalize the long-run costs of redistribution and to be more credible in their commitment to redistribution, leading them to redistribute less. With entirely different data, the paper also provides evidence on mechanisms: left-wing governments not only redistribute more, they tax more; older left-wing parties, though, tax less than younger ones.