Macroinsurance for Microenterprises : A Randomized Experiment in Post-Revolution Egypt

Firms in many developing countries cite macroeconomic instability and political uncertainty as major constraints to their growth. Economic theory suggests uncertainty can cause firms to delay investments until uncertainty is resolved. A randomized experiment was conducted in post-revolution Egypt to measure the impact of insuring microenterprises against macroeconomic and political uncertainty. Demand for macroeconomic shock insurance was high; 36.7 percent of microentrepreneurs in the treatment group purchased insurance. However, purchasing insurance does not change the likelihood that a business takes a new loan, the size of the loan, or how the loan is invested. This lack of effect is attributed to microenterprises largely investing in inventories and raw materials rather than irreversible investments like equipment. These results suggest that, contrary to what some firms profess, macroeconomic and political risk is not inhibiting the investment behavior of microenterprises. However, insurance may still be of value to help firms cope with shocks when they do occur, but the paper is unable to examine this dimension, because the insurance product did not pay out over the course of the pilot.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Groh, Matthew, McKenzie, David
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank Group, Washington, DC 2014-09
Subjects:ACCESS TO FINANCE, ACCESS TO FINANCING, ACCOUNTING, ACTUARIALLY FAIR INSURANCE, AMOUNT OF LOAN, APR, ASSETS, BANK LOAN, BANK POLICY, BANKING LAWS, BANKS, BORROWING, BUSINESS ACTIVITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, BUSINESS OWNER, BUSINESS OWNERS, BUSINESS RISK, CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, CAPITAL STOCK, CASH FLOW, CASH ON HAND, CHECKS, CONSUMERS, CORRUPTION, CREDIT OFFICER, CURRENCY, DEBT, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DISCOUNT RATE, DUMMY VARIABLE, ECONOMIC THEORY, EDUCATION LEVELS, ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA, EMERGENCY LOAN, EMPLOYEE, EQUALITY, EQUIPMENT, EQUIPMENT PURCHASES, EXCHANGE RATE, FAIR PRICE, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL LITERACY, FIRE INSURANCE, FIRM PERFORMANCE, GASOLINE PRICES, GENDER, GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES, GREATER ACCESS, GROUP LOAN, HEALTH INSURANCE, HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, HOUSEHOLDS, HUMAN CAPITAL, INCOME, INDIVIDUAL LOANS, INFLATION, INSTALLMENT, INSTALLMENTS, INSURANCE, INSURANCE AGENCY, INSURANCE COVERAGE, INSURANCE MARKETS, INSURANCE PAYMENTS, INSURANCE PAYOUT, INSURANCE PENETRATION, INSURANCE POLICY, INSURANCE PREMIUM, INSURANCE PRODUCT, INSURANCE PRODUCTS, INSURANCE PROGRAM, INSURANCE SERVICES, INTEREST PAYMENT, INTEREST RATE, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INVENTORIES, INVENTORY, INVESTING, INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES, INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR, INVESTMENT CLIMATE, INVESTMENT DECISIONS, INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES, LACK OF KNOWLEDGE, LEGAL SYSTEM, LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUMS, LIQUIDITY, LOAN, LOAN AMOUNT, LOAN AMOUNTS, LOAN OFFICER, LOAN OFFICERS, LOAN PERIOD, LOAN PRINCIPAL, LOAN PROGRAM, LOAN SIZE, LOAN SIZES, LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS, MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY, MACROECONOMIC RISKS, MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY, MARGINAL COEFFICIENTS, MARKET PRICES, MEDIAN FIRM, MFIS, MICROENTERPRISES, MICROFINANCE, MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION, MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS, MICROFINANCE LOAN, MICROFINANCE LOANS, NEED FOR CREDIT, NEGOTIATIONS, NEW MARKET, POLICY ANALYSIS, POLITICAL RISK, POLITICAL RISKS, POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, PORTFOLIOS, PRINCIPAL PAYMENT, PROFITABILITY, PUBLIC POLICY, REFERENDUM, REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS, REGULATORY POLICY, REPAYMENT, RESERVES, RETURN, RETURNS, RISK AVERSION, RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK OF DEFAULTS, RISK SHARING, SAVINGS, SET ASIDE, SMALL BUSINESS, SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS, SMALL ENTERPRISES, SOCIAL FUND, SOURCES OF FINANCE, STOCK EXCHANGE, STOCK MARKET, SUBSISTENCE FARMERS, SUBSTITUTION, TAX, TAX RATES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRUST FUNDS, VILLAGES, WEATHER INSURANCE, WORKING CAPITAL,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/09/20238435/macroinsurance-microenterprises-randomized-experiment-post-revolution-egypt
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/20368
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Firms in many developing countries cite macroeconomic instability and political uncertainty as major constraints to their growth. Economic theory suggests uncertainty can cause firms to delay investments until uncertainty is resolved. A randomized experiment was conducted in post-revolution Egypt to measure the impact of insuring microenterprises against macroeconomic and political uncertainty. Demand for macroeconomic shock insurance was high; 36.7 percent of microentrepreneurs in the treatment group purchased insurance. However, purchasing insurance does not change the likelihood that a business takes a new loan, the size of the loan, or how the loan is invested. This lack of effect is attributed to microenterprises largely investing in inventories and raw materials rather than irreversible investments like equipment. These results suggest that, contrary to what some firms profess, macroeconomic and political risk is not inhibiting the investment behavior of microenterprises. However, insurance may still be of value to help firms cope with shocks when they do occur, but the paper is unable to examine this dimension, because the insurance product did not pay out over the course of the pilot.