New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions

This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: 1) Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances. 2) Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition. 3) Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs, find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics, that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Clarke, George, Beck, Thorsten, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip, Walsh, Patrick
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2000-02
Subjects:	BUDGET DEFICITS, CABINET, CABINETS, CITIZENS, CIVIL WAR, COALITION GOVERNMENTS, COALITIONS, CODING, COMMUNIST, COMMUNIST PARTY, COMPETITION POLICY, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENTS, CONSTITUTION, CORRUPTION, COUNTRY DATA, CROSS COUNTRY DATA, DECISION MAKERS, DECISION MAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION, DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES, DISTRICTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ELECTION, ELECTION DATA, ELECTORAL RULES, ELECTORAL SYSTEM, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT, FEDERALISM, FISCAL, FISCAL POLICY, GOVERNMENT ACTION, GOVERNMENT DECISION, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GOVERNMENT POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, LEGISLATIVE POWERS, LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATURES, LOWER HOUSE, MILITARY INFLUENCE, MINISTERS, NATIONAL LEGISLATORS, NATIONAL LEVEL, NATIONALISM, NATIONS, OPPOSITION PARTIES, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, POLICY ISSUES, POLICY MAKERS, POLICY MAKING, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLITICAL CONDITIONS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PROCESS, POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLITICIANS, POVERTY ALLEVIATION, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, PRESIDENTS, PRIMARIES, PRIME MINISTER, PRIME MINISTERS, PROGRAMS, PUBLIC DEBT, REGULATORY POLICY, REPRESENTATIVES, REVOLUTION, SENATE, SOCIAL CONFLICT, SOCIAL POLICY, STATE CONTROL, STATE RESOURCES, SUBJECTIVE DATA, TAXATION, TOTALITARIANISM, UPPER HOUSE, UPPER HOUSES, VETO, VETO POWER, VOTING, VOTING RECORDS,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/02/438377/new-tools-new-tests-comparative-political-economy-database-political-institutions https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19850
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