Deposit Insurance Around the Globe : Where Does It Work?

Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries not advanced in financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. The authors document the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design and review empirical evidence on how design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first addresing weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Kane, Edward J.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2001-09
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY, ACCOUNTING, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, AUDITS, BANK CAPITAL, BANK DEPOSITS, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, BANK PERFORMANCE, BANK RISK, BANK RUNS, BANK SOLVENCY, BANKING CRISIS, BANKING REGULATION, BANKING SECTOR, BANKING STABILITY, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKRUPTCY, BANKS, BLANKET DEPOSIT GUARANTEES, BLANKET DEPOSIT INSURANCE, CAPITAL FLIGHT, CAPITAL STANDARDS, CDS, CENTRAL BANK, COINSURANCE, COMMERCIAL BANKS, COMPENSATION, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COVERAGE, CREDIT UNIONS, CROSS- COUNTRY EXPERIENCE, DEBT, DEFAULT RISK, DEPOSIT GUARANTEES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE COSTS, DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES, DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS, DEPOSITOR PROTECTION, DEPOSITORS, DEPOSITS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FINANCIAL CRISES, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL POLICIES, FINANCIAL STABILITY, FINANCING MECHANISMS, FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS, GAMBLING, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES, INDIRECT COST, INSOLVENCY, INSOLVENT BANKS, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, INSURANCE COVERAGE, INSURANCE DESIGN, INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS, INSURANCE SYSTEM, INSURED DEPOSITS, INTEREST RATES, INTEREST SENSITIVITY, LIQUIDITY, LOOTING, MARKET DISCIPLINE, MITIGATION, MORAL HAZARD, NET LOSS, PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT, PROGRAMS, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS, PUBLIC DEBT, REGULATORY FORBEARANCE, RESERVES, RISK FACTORS, RISK PREMIUMS, SAFETY NET POLICIES, SAFETY NETS, SAVINGS, SAVINGS BANKS, SHAREHOLDERS, SMALL BANKS, STABILIZATION, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, STOCK PRICES, SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES, THRIFT INSTITUTIONS, TRANSPARENCY,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614729/deposit-insurance-around-globe-work-vol-1-4 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19549
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