Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates
In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.
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dig-okr-10986174312024-08-08T17:29:28Z Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures. 2014-03-27T20:08:21Z 2014-03-27T20:08:21Z 2003-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278693/equitable-provision-long-term-public-goods-role-negotiation-mandates https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3180 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
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DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION |
| spellingShingle |
ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates |
| description |
In a one-period model, whether or not
individual weights in the welfare function are based on
initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But
with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution
still allows for several equilibriums depending on
Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in
negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they
care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and
universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In
all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating
expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both
the optimal level of public goods and the second-period
distribution of expenditures. |
| topic_facet |
ABATEMENT ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS ABATEMENT COSTS ATMOSPHERE BENCHMARK BIODIVERSITY CARBON CLIMATE CLIMATE CHANGE COST FUNCTIONS DAMAGES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATES DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMISSION EMISSION RIGHTS EMISSIONS EMISSIONS RIGHTS EMISSIONS TRADING ENGINEERING ENTITLEMENTS EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPERIMENTS EXTERNALITY FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE GDP GLOBAL WARMING GREENHOUSE GASES GROWTH RATE INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY MARGINAL ABATEMENT MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION MARGINAL UTILITY MULTIPLIERS NATIONAL INCOME OZONE OZONE LAYER PER CAPITA INCOME POLITICAL ECONOMY PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TEMPERATURE UNCERTAINTY UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION |
| author |
Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles |
| author_facet |
Lecocq, Franck Hourcade, Jean-Charles |
| author_sort |
Lecocq, Franck |
| title |
Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates |
| title_short |
Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates |
| title_full |
Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates |
| title_fullStr |
Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates |
| title_sort |
equitable provision of long-term public goods : the role of negotiation mandates |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2003-12 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278693/equitable-provision-long-term-public-goods-role-negotiation-mandates https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT lecocqfranck equitableprovisionoflongtermpublicgoodstheroleofnegotiationmandates AT hourcadejeancharles equitableprovisionoflongtermpublicgoodstheroleofnegotiationmandates |
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1807154900248821760 |