Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates

Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates

In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Lecocq, Franck, Hourcade, Jean-Charles
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2003-12
Subjects:ABATEMENT, ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS, ABATEMENT COSTS, ATMOSPHERE, BENCHMARK, BIODIVERSITY, CARBON, CLIMATE, CLIMATE CHANGE, COST FUNCTIONS, DAMAGES, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DISCOUNT RATE, DISCOUNT RATES, DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, ECONOMICS, ECONOMISTS, EMISSION, EMISSION RIGHTS, EMISSIONS, EMISSIONS RIGHTS, EMISSIONS TRADING, ENGINEERING, ENTITLEMENTS, EQUATIONS, EQUILIBRIUM, EXPENDITURES, EXPERIMENTS, EXTERNALITY, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GDP, GLOBAL WARMING, GREENHOUSE GASES, GROWTH RATE, INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME LEVELS, INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, MARGINAL ABATEMENT, MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS, MARGINAL BENEFITS, MARGINAL COST, MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION, MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTION, MARGINAL UTILITY, MULTIPLIERS, NATIONAL INCOME, OZONE, OZONE LAYER, PER CAPITA INCOME, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, TEMPERATURE, UNCERTAINTY, UTILITY FUNCTION, UTILITY FUNCTIONS, WEALTH, WELFARE FUNCTION,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278693/equitable-provision-long-term-public-goods-role-negotiation-mandates
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.

Similar Items