Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation : How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?

A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which will be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the world trade organization's agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jack, William, Lanjouw, Jean O.
Format: Journal Article biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2005-01
Subjects:ADVERTISING, ARBITRAGE, BENCHMARK, CONSUMER DEMAND, CONSUMER SURPLUS, CONSUMERS, COST INCREASES, COST OF CAPITAL, COUNTRY MARKETS, CUSTOMS, DAMAGES, DEMAND ELASTICITY, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, DEVELOPING ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, DIFFERENTIAL PRICING, E-MAIL, E-MAIL ADDRESS, ECONOMIC COOPERATION, ECONOMIC LAW, ECONOMIC RENTS, ELASTICITY, ELASTICITY OF DEMAND, FAIR, FIXED COSTS, FORMAL ANALYSES, FREE MARKET, INCENTIVE EFFECTS, INCOME, INCOME LEVELS, INCOME TAX, INCOMES, INCREASING RETURNS, INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE, INNOVATION, INNOVATION POLICY, INNOVATIONS, INSTITUTION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INVENTION, LEGAL ISSUES, LICENSE, LICENSES, MACROECONOMICS, MANUFACTURING, MARGINAL COST, MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION, MARGINAL COST PRICING, MARGINAL COSTS, MARGINAL REVENUE, MARGINAL UTILITY, MARKETING, MONOPOLY, MONOPOLY PRICE, MONOPOLY PRICES, NEW PRODUCTS, PATENTS, POSTAL SERVICE, POSTAL SERVICES, PRICE CEILINGS, PRICE CONTROL, PRICE CONTROLS, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, PRICE INCREASE, PRICE LEVELS, PRICE REGULATION, PRICE STRUCTURE, PRICE STRUCTURES, PRICING MODEL, PRICING POLICIES, PROCUREMENT, PRODUCTIVITY, PROFIT MARGIN, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC POLICY, R&D, RAMSEY PRICE, RAMSEY PRICES, REGULATORS, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH INVESTMENT, RESULT, RESULTS, RETURNS TO SCALE, SALE, SALES, SALES ARRANGEMENTS, SAVINGS, SENIOR CITIZEN, SOCIAL COST, SOCIAL COSTS, SOCIAL VALUE, SUPPLIERS, TARGETS, TAX, TAX CREDITS, TAX RATES, TAX STRUCTURE, TAX SYSTEM, TAXATION, USES, UTILITY FUNCTION, VOTERS, WORLD TRADE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/01/17747581/financing-pharmaceutical-innovation-much-poor-countries-contribute
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16481
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Summary:A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which will be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the world trade organization's agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.