Organizing for Prosperity : Collective Action, Political Parties and the Political Economy of Development

Organizing for Prosperity : Collective Action, Political Parties and the Political Economy of Development

The ability of citizens to act collectively plays a central role in major debates in the political economy of development, including the causes and consequences of democratization and clientelism. This essay uses two lines of research to underscore the importance of explicitly introducing the organization of collective action into these debates. Exhaustive research on the management of open access resources demonstrates that citizens' ability to act collectively depends on non-trivial organizational arrangements that allow leaders to sanction free-riding and allow members to replace leaders if they shirk. Other research demonstrates wide variability in the organization of political parties. In countries where political parties do not have these two organizational characteristics, public policies are less friendly to economic development. This evidence suggests that in future research on democracy, state-building and development, citizen organization should be a central object of analysis.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Keefer, Philip
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013-08
Subjects:BUDGET CYCLE, BUREAUCRACY, CANDIDATES, CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTIES, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY, COLLECTIVE, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS, COLLECTIVE INTEREST, COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, COMPETITORS, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENT, DECISION MAKERS, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, DICTATORSHIP, DIRECT DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ELECTION, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL SUCCESS, EMERGING DEMOCRACIES, EMPLOYMENT, ERP, FIRMS, FRANCHISE, FREE PRESS, HUMAN CAPITAL, INDIVIDUALS, JOB CREATION, LEGISLATORS, LIMITED, LOYALTY, MAJORITIES, MUNICIPALITIES, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, PARTY LEADERSHIP, PATRONAGE, PEACE, POLICY ISSUES, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, POLITICAL CHANGE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTY, POLITICAL PROCESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL SUPPORT, POLITICIANS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC POLICY, REPRESENTATIVES, RIGHT TO VOTE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SOCIETIES, SOCIETY, SUFFRAGE, UNION, VOTING, VOTING PATTERNS,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/08/18143375/organizing-prosperity-collective-action-political-parties-political-economy-development
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16016
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Summary:The ability of citizens to act collectively plays a central role in major debates in the political economy of development, including the causes and consequences of democratization and clientelism. This essay uses two lines of research to underscore the importance of explicitly introducing the organization of collective action into these debates. Exhaustive research on the management of open access resources demonstrates that citizens' ability to act collectively depends on non-trivial organizational arrangements that allow leaders to sanction free-riding and allow members to replace leaders if they shirk. Other research demonstrates wide variability in the organization of political parties. In countries where political parties do not have these two organizational characteristics, public policies are less friendly to economic development. This evidence suggests that in future research on democracy, state-building and development, citizen organization should be a central object of analysis.

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