Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences

Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences

This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kee, Hiau Looi, Olarreaga, Marcelo, Silva, Peri
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2004-01
Subjects:AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, AGRICULTURE, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES, CENTRAL AMERICA, CONSUMER SURPLUS, CONSUMERS, DEMOCRACY, DICTATORSHIP, DOMESTIC MARKET, DOMESTIC PRODUCERS, DUMPING, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC FACTORS, ELASTICITY, EMPIRICAL STUDIES, EQUILIBRIUM, EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION, EXPENDITURES, EXPORT GROWTH, EXPORTERS, EXPORTING COUNTRIES, EXPORTING COUNTRY, EXPORTS, FISHING, FOREIGN EXPORTERS, FOREIGN PRODUCERS, FREE TRADE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, FREE TRADE AREA, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, IMPORTING COUNTRY, IMPORTS, INCOME, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LATIN AMERICAN, LEGISLATION, LOBBYING, LOBBYISTS, MARKET ACCESS, MINIMIS LEVEL, NATIONALS, NON-TARIFF BARRIERS, POLICY INSTRUMENTS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PREFERENTIAL ACCESS, PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS, PREFERENTIAL TARIFF, PREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIME, PRODUCER SURPLUS, PRODUCERS, QUOTAS, SOUTH AMERICA, SOUTH AMERICAN, SUBSTITUTION EFFECT, TARIFF BARRIERS, TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS, TARIFF PREFERENCE, TARIFF PREFERENCES, TARIFF RATES, TARIFF REDUCTIONS, TARIFF REVENUE, TRADE BARRIERS, TRADE ISSUES, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE POLICY, TRADE PREFERENCES, TRADING PARTNERS, UTILITY FUNCTION, WELFARE FUNCTION, WORLD TRADE,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206
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Summary:This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.

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