Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours, and Road Closures

During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe aiming to move decision making for local public services closer to the people. The countries embracing and adapting to this silent revolution have had diverse motives and followed even more diverse approaches. This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and approaches used to strengthen local governance. The quest for the right balance, i.e. appropriate division of powers among different levels of government, is not always the primary reason for decentralizing. There is evidence that the decentralization decision may have more to do with short-term political considerations than the long-run benefits of decentralization. To take stock of progress worldwide, we take a comparative look at developments in political, fiscal and administrative decentralization for a selected group of countries. Most of the decentralization literature deals with normative issues regarding the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of government and the design of fiscal transfers. The process of decentralization has not received the attention it deserves as the best laid plans can fail due to implementation difficulties. We revisit major controversies regarding preferred approaches to obtaining a successful outcome. Key approaches examined are big push versus small steps; bottom up vs. top down; and uniform vs. asymmetric decentralization. Finally, Indonesia's 1999 big bang decentralization program is evaluated. The program should be commended for its achievements over a short period of time, however incentives are lacking for local governments to be accountable and responsive to their residents.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Thompson, Theresa, Shah, Anwar
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2004-06
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, AD HOC GRANTS, ASSIGNMENT OF EXPENDITURES, ASSIGNMENT OF TAXES, AUTHORITY, AUTONOMY, BORROWING, CAPITAL GRANTS, CAPITAL PROJECTS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY, CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, CITIZENS, CIVIL SERVICE, COMMUNIST, CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONS, CORPORATE INCOME TAX, CREDITWORTHINESS, DECENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS, DECISION MAKING, DECISION-MAKING, DECONCENTRATION, DEFICITS, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIZATION, DEVOLUTION, DISTRICTS, DIVISION OF POWERS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ELECTED OFFICIALS, EMPLOYMENT, ETHNIC GROUPS, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS, EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES, FEDERALISM, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, FISCAL, FISCAL CAPACITIES, FISCAL CAPACITY, FISCAL CRISES, FISCAL CRISIS, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL EQUALIZATION, FISCAL FEDERALISM, FISCAL GAP, FISCAL GAPS, FORMULA BASED TRANSFERS, FUEL TAXES, GOVERNMENT FINANCE, GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS, GOVERNMENT REVENUE, GOVERNMENT REVENUES, GOVERNMENT ROLE, GRANT DESIGN, GRANT PROGRAMS, HEALTH EXPENDITURES, HEALTH SPENDING, HOUSING, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS, INTERMEDIATE LEVEL GOVERNMENTS, LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURE, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LEVIES, LOBBYING, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, LOCAL COUNCILS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL REVENUE, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, MATCHING GRANTS, MOTIVATIONS, MUNICIPAL SERVICES, MUNICIPALITIES, MUNICIPALITY, NATIONAL EXPENDITURES, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL LEVEL, NATIONS, NUISANCE TAXES, OPERATING EXPENDITURES, POLITICAL CRISIS, POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION, POLITICAL FEASIBILITY, POLITICIANS, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION, PROPERTY TAXES, PROPERTY TRANSFER TAXES, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, PROVISIONS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICES, REGULATORY AUTHORITY, REPRESENTATIVES, REVENUE COLLECTION, REVENUE EQUALIZATION, REVENUE SHARING, REVOLUTION, ROADS, RURAL PROPERTY, SALES TAXES, SOCIAL SERVICES, STATE ENTERPRISES, SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE, TAX, TAX AUTHORITY, TAX COLLECTION, TAX RATES, TAX SHARING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TOTAL EXPENDITURES, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, UNFUNDED MANDATES, URBAN TRANSPORTATION, USER CHARGES GOVERNANCE, DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT, DECENTRALIZATION IN MANAGEMENT, REVENUE, FISCAL TRANSFERS, INCENTIVES, GLOBALIZATION,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983931/implementing-decentralized-local-governance-treacherous-road-potholes-detours-road-closures
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14178
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Summary:During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe aiming to move decision making for local public services closer to the people. The countries embracing and adapting to this silent revolution have had diverse motives and followed even more diverse approaches. This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and approaches used to strengthen local governance. The quest for the right balance, i.e. appropriate division of powers among different levels of government, is not always the primary reason for decentralizing. There is evidence that the decentralization decision may have more to do with short-term political considerations than the long-run benefits of decentralization. To take stock of progress worldwide, we take a comparative look at developments in political, fiscal and administrative decentralization for a selected group of countries. Most of the decentralization literature deals with normative issues regarding the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of government and the design of fiscal transfers. The process of decentralization has not received the attention it deserves as the best laid plans can fail due to implementation difficulties. We revisit major controversies regarding preferred approaches to obtaining a successful outcome. Key approaches examined are big push versus small steps; bottom up vs. top down; and uniform vs. asymmetric decentralization. Finally, Indonesia's 1999 big bang decentralization program is evaluated. The program should be commended for its achievements over a short period of time, however incentives are lacking for local governments to be accountable and responsive to their residents.