Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
Should a conceding authority auction off or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue that a formal competition may take too much time, that the costs of preparing bids may be excessive, and that innovation may be discouraged. But proponents of competitive bidding argue that there are ways to address theses concerns without sacrificing the bidding process. Moreover, they argue, competition may yield a better deal for the conceding authority and enhance the transparency of the process, making the transaction more politically sustainable. This Note examines the arguments.
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1998-11
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| Subjects: | CONCESSIONS, AUCTIONS, CONTRACT NEGOTIATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, BIDDING, BIDDING PROCESS, ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION, AUTHORITY, BARGAINING POWER, BENCHMARK, BENCHMARK PRICE, BENCHMARKS, BID, BIDDERS, BIDS, BONDS, COMPETITIVE BIDDING, COMPETITIVE TENDER, CONSUMERS, CORRUPTION, DEREGULATION, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, FINANCIAL STRENGTH, GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS, INNOVATIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LEARNING, MONOPOLIES, RISK AVERSION, TENDERING, TOTAL COSTS, TRANSPARENCY, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526 |
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dig-okr-10986115262024-08-08T18:08:38Z Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? Klein, Michael CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY Should a conceding authority auction off or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue that a formal competition may take too much time, that the costs of preparing bids may be excessive, and that innovation may be discouraged. But proponents of competitive bidding argue that there are ways to address theses concerns without sacrificing the bidding process. Moreover, they argue, competition may yield a better deal for the conceding authority and enhance the transparency of the process, making the transaction more politically sustainable. This Note examines the arguments. 2012-08-13T15:18:23Z 2012-08-13T15:18:23Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction Viewpoint. -- Note no. 159 (November 1998) https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
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| country |
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| countrycode |
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| component |
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| databasecode |
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| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English |
| topic |
CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY |
| spellingShingle |
CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY Klein, Michael Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? |
| description |
Should a conceding authority auction off
or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private
infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue
that a formal competition may take too much time, that the
costs of preparing bids may be excessive, and that
innovation may be discouraged. But proponents of competitive
bidding argue that there are ways to address theses concerns
without sacrificing the bidding process. Moreover, they
argue, competition may yield a better deal for the conceding
authority and enhance the transparency of the process,
making the transaction more politically sustainable. This
Note examines the arguments. |
| topic_facet |
CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY |
| author |
Klein, Michael |
| author_facet |
Klein, Michael |
| author_sort |
Klein, Michael |
| title |
Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? |
| title_short |
Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? |
| title_full |
Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? |
| title_fullStr |
Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? |
| title_sort |
infrastructure concessions : to auction or not to auction? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
1998-11 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT kleinmichael infrastructureconcessionstoauctionornottoauction |
| _version_ |
1807158915562995712 |