Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?

Should a conceding authority auction off or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue that a formal competition may take too much time, that the costs of preparing bids may be excessive, and that innovation may be discouraged. But proponents of competitive bidding argue that there are ways to address theses concerns without sacrificing the bidding process. Moreover, they argue, competition may yield a better deal for the conceding authority and enhance the transparency of the process, making the transaction more politically sustainable. This Note examines the arguments.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Klein, Michael
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 1998-11
Subjects:	CONCESSIONS, AUCTIONS, CONTRACT NEGOTIATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, BIDDING, BIDDING PROCESS, ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION, AUTHORITY, BARGAINING POWER, BENCHMARK, BENCHMARK PRICE, BENCHMARKS, BID, BIDDERS, BIDS, BONDS, COMPETITIVE BIDDING, COMPETITIVE TENDER, CONSUMERS, CORRUPTION, DEREGULATION, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, FINANCIAL STRENGTH, GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS, INNOVATIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LEARNING, MONOPOLIES, RISK AVERSION, TENDERING, TOTAL COSTS, TRANSPARENCY,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526
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