Between incentives and coercion: the thwarted implementation of PES schemes in Madagascar's dense forests

Between incentives and coercion: the thwarted implementation of PES schemes in Madagascar's dense forests

The basic principle of PES is to pay individuals or groups to protect or enhance natural resources in exchange for financial or in-kind compensation. One striking feature of the PES concept is the diversity of “PES-like” schemes in the real world, which differ greatly from the theoretical conceptualization of PES. We assume that the wide range of designs and outcomes is due to the use of PES tools in particular environmental, political, and economic contexts. More precisely, existing conservation strategies is a determining factor in shaping the PSE-inspired interventions. Here, we analyze the implementation of an internationally-designed direct payments program in Madagascar. We show that the predominance of a coercive logic in the Malagasy conservation strategy determines the conditions under which the direct payments scheme is implemented. The direct payments scheme is intended to be a complementary device for protected area rather than an instrument for land-use change, thus producing initiatives closer to ICDP than PES. Yet, its potential to supplement the implementation of protected area is currently limited, leading us to discuss the conditions under which this potential could be fulfilled.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Brimont, Laura, Karsenty, Alain
Format: article biblioteca
Language:eng
Published: Elsevier
Subjects:P01 - Conservation de la nature et ressources foncières, E13 - Investissements, financement et crédit, E14 - Économie et politique du développement, K01 - Foresterie - Considérations générales, forêt tropicale, protection de la forêt, conservation des ressources, gestion des ressources naturelles, politique de l'environnement, incitation, montant compensatoire, utilisation des terres, financement, zone protégée, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_24904, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_28075, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_6523, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_9000115, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_2597, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_3818, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_28654, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_4182, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_29785, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_37952, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_4510,
Online Access:http://agritrop.cirad.fr/576640/
http://agritrop.cirad.fr/576640/1/576640.pdf
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Summary:The basic principle of PES is to pay individuals or groups to protect or enhance natural resources in exchange for financial or in-kind compensation. One striking feature of the PES concept is the diversity of “PES-like” schemes in the real world, which differ greatly from the theoretical conceptualization of PES. We assume that the wide range of designs and outcomes is due to the use of PES tools in particular environmental, political, and economic contexts. More precisely, existing conservation strategies is a determining factor in shaping the PSE-inspired interventions. Here, we analyze the implementation of an internationally-designed direct payments program in Madagascar. We show that the predominance of a coercive logic in the Malagasy conservation strategy determines the conditions under which the direct payments scheme is implemented. The direct payments scheme is intended to be a complementary device for protected area rather than an instrument for land-use change, thus producing initiatives closer to ICDP than PES. Yet, its potential to supplement the implementation of protected area is currently limited, leading us to discuss the conditions under which this potential could be fulfilled.

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