Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: A Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States
Abstract Much of the literature on Presidentialism focuses on the argument that bipartisan presidential systems are better able to avoid a conflictive Executive-Legislative relationship by facilitating the formation of coalitions in Congress and partisan ideological identification. From a comparative perspective, this study aims to identify and discuss the ability of the presidents of the United States and Brazil to promote public policy, and to examine the degree of conflict in the drafting of these policies by studying legislative vetoes. In addition, it analyzes the success rate of welfare bills voted in the lower chamber of the two countries and supported by their respective presidents. The period studied here covers 16 years (from 1995 to 2010 in Brazil and in the United States from 1993 to 2008), consisting of eight years of more liberal administrations and eight years of more conservative ones in each country. The presented hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between two-party or multi-party systems in terms of conflict, public policy drafting and presidential success rate. The data are analyzed using multivariate regressions and undergo qualitative treatment for a deeper understanding.
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales
2019
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0185-19182019000300269 |
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