Chilean unremunerated reserve requirement capital controls as a screening mechanism
ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of Chilean style "speed bump" capital controls that interprets them as a mechanism for screening out volatile investor types. This interpretation is contrasted with a public finance explanation which views speed bumps as a tax on short term capital inflows that raises their relative price. A surprising result is that even though speed bumps raise the cost of capital, they may actually increase the level of inflows. These increased inflows are more stable because they are provided by patient investors. The lesson is that screening out volatile investor types stabilizes the financial environment. Speed bumps benefit both firms and patient investors by reducing the damage done by sudden exit, which increases the demand for and supply of capital.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Economía
2005
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0185-16672005000100032 |
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