ASSERTION AND ASSESSMENT SENSITIVITY
ABSTRACT Gareth Evans (1985) and Sven Rosenkranz (2008) have respectively formulated two objections to truth relativism that would show that this view does not cohere with our practice of asserting. I argue that the relativist should answer such objections by appealing to the notion of assessment sensitivity. Since the relativist accounts for this notion by means of a technical truth predicate relating propositions to contexts of assessment, the task left to her turns out to be to make sense of assessment sensitivity by making sense of this predicate (i.e. by showing that it expresses a truth notion).
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
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Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG
2019
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| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-512X2019000200355 |
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