A weak version of Barberà-Kelly's Theorem
ABSTRACT. Lifting preferences over candidates to preferences over sets of candidates allows us to give a very natural notion of manipulability for social choice functions. In particular, we give simple conditions over the liftings entailing the manipulability of reasonable social choice functions. Our result is a weak version of Barbera and Kelly's Theorem, indeed it can be obtained from this last Theorem. However, we give a direct and very natural proof of our manipulability Theorem which is informative about the nature of the liftings allowing manipulability.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional de Colombia y Sociedad Colombiana de Matemáticas
2017
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-74262017000200173 |
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