A coalition approach to trade policymaking in the United States: the fast-track authority fiasco of 1997 and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China in 2000
Abstract This article proposes a framework centered on coalitions between the executive, the congress and interest groups for the analysis of the US trade policymaking process. Such a framework is focused on two main concepts, “willingness to bargain” and “pivotal actor”. The work advances two main hypotheses related to the ability of pro-free-trade actors to come to an agreement and anti-free-trade actors to effectively oppose trade liberalization. Two case studies are undertaken in order to check the plausibility of such hypotheses: the fast-track fiasco (1997) and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China (2000).
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília
2017
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| Online Access: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292017000100210 |
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