On Deontic Truth and Values

SUMMARY This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.

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Main Author: Moreso,J. J.
Format: Digital revista
Language:English
Published: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas 2017
Online Access:http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032017000200061
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spelling oai:scielo:S0011-150320170002000612020-04-17On Deontic Truth and ValuesMoreso,J. J. Alchourrón-Bulygin ethical relativism ethical constructivism burden of proof particularism SUMMARY This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones FilosóficasCrítica (México, D.F.) v.49 n.146 20172017-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articletext/htmlhttp://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032017000200061en10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181
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language English
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author Moreso,J. J.
spellingShingle Moreso,J. J.
On Deontic Truth and Values
author_facet Moreso,J. J.
author_sort Moreso,J. J.
title On Deontic Truth and Values
title_short On Deontic Truth and Values
title_full On Deontic Truth and Values
title_fullStr On Deontic Truth and Values
title_full_unstemmed On Deontic Truth and Values
title_sort on deontic truth and values
description SUMMARY This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.
publisher Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
publishDate 2017
url http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032017000200061
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