On Deontic Truth and Values
SUMMARY This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
2017
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032017000200061 |
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