Revisiting Frankfurt on freedom and responsibility
Abstract According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.
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| Format: | Digital revista |
| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
2016
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-15032016000100035 |
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