Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky
The tradition of natural kinds has shaped philosophical debates about scientific classification but has come under growing criticism. Responding to this criticism, Reydon and Ereshefsky present their grounded functionality account as a strategy for updating and defending the tradition of natural kinds. This article argues that grounded functionality does indeed provide a fruitful philosophical approach to scientific classification but does not convince as a general theory of natural kinds. Instead, the strengths and limitations of Reydon and Ereshefsky’s account illustrate why it is time to move beyond general definitions of “natural kind” and experiment with new philosophical frameworks.
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Format: | Article/Letter to editor biblioteca |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | Grounded functionality, Material kinds, Materiality, Natural kinds, Ontology, Scientific classification, |
Online Access: | https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/philosophy-without-natural-kinds-a-reply-to-reydon-amp-ereshefsky |
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dig-wur-nl-wurpubs-6333082024-10-01 Ludwig, David Article/Letter to editor European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (2024) 3 ISSN: 1879-4912 Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky 2024 The tradition of natural kinds has shaped philosophical debates about scientific classification but has come under growing criticism. Responding to this criticism, Reydon and Ereshefsky present their grounded functionality account as a strategy for updating and defending the tradition of natural kinds. This article argues that grounded functionality does indeed provide a fruitful philosophical approach to scientific classification but does not convince as a general theory of natural kinds. Instead, the strengths and limitations of Reydon and Ereshefsky’s account illustrate why it is time to move beyond general definitions of “natural kind” and experiment with new philosophical frameworks. en application/pdf https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/philosophy-without-natural-kinds-a-reply-to-reydon-amp-ereshefsky 10.1007/s13194-024-00594-5 https://edepot.wur.nl/671435 Grounded functionality Material kinds Materiality Natural kinds Ontology Scientific classification https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Wageningen University & Research |
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Grounded functionality Material kinds Materiality Natural kinds Ontology Scientific classification Grounded functionality Material kinds Materiality Natural kinds Ontology Scientific classification Ludwig, David Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky |
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The tradition of natural kinds has shaped philosophical debates about scientific classification but has come under growing criticism. Responding to this criticism, Reydon and Ereshefsky present their grounded functionality account as a strategy for updating and defending the tradition of natural kinds. This article argues that grounded functionality does indeed provide a fruitful philosophical approach to scientific classification but does not convince as a general theory of natural kinds. Instead, the strengths and limitations of Reydon and Ereshefsky’s account illustrate why it is time to move beyond general definitions of “natural kind” and experiment with new philosophical frameworks. |
format |
Article/Letter to editor |
topic_facet |
Grounded functionality Material kinds Materiality Natural kinds Ontology Scientific classification |
author |
Ludwig, David |
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Ludwig, David |
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Ludwig, David |
title |
Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky |
title_short |
Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky |
title_full |
Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky |
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Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky |
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Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky |
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philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to reydon & ereshefsky |
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https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/philosophy-without-natural-kinds-a-reply-to-reydon-amp-ereshefsky |
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AT ludwigdavid philosophywithoutnaturalkindsareplytoreydonereshefsky |
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