Philosophy without natural kinds: a reply to Reydon & Ereshefsky
The tradition of natural kinds has shaped philosophical debates about scientific classification but has come under growing criticism. Responding to this criticism, Reydon and Ereshefsky present their grounded functionality account as a strategy for updating and defending the tradition of natural kinds. This article argues that grounded functionality does indeed provide a fruitful philosophical approach to scientific classification but does not convince as a general theory of natural kinds. Instead, the strengths and limitations of Reydon and Ereshefsky’s account illustrate why it is time to move beyond general definitions of “natural kind” and experiment with new philosophical frameworks.
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| Format: | Article/Letter to editor biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Grounded functionality, Material kinds, Materiality, Natural kinds, Ontology, Scientific classification, |
| Online Access: | https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/philosophy-without-natural-kinds-a-reply-to-reydon-amp-ereshefsky |
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