The World Trade Organization and Antidumping in Developing Countries

Since the 1995 inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries have become some of the most frequent users of the WTO-sanctioned antidumping trade policy instrument. This paper exploits newly available data to examine the pattern of actual industrial use of antidumping in nine of the major "new user" developing countries - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela. For these countries we are able to match data from two newly available sources: data on production in 28 different 3-digit ISIC industries from the Trade, Production and Protection Database to data on antidumping investigations, outcomes and imports at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level from the Global Antidumping Database. Our econometric analysis is to estimate a two-stage model of the industry-level decision to pursue an antidumping investigation and the national government's decision of whether and how much antidumping import protection to provide. First, we find evidence consistent with the theory of endogenous trade policy: larger industries that face substantial import competition are more likely to pursue an antidumping investigation, and larger and more concentrated industries receive greater antidumping protection from imports. Second, we find that industries that use antidumping are more likely to face the changing economic conditions specified by the technical evidentiary criteria of the WTO Antidumping Agreement: industries that face rapidly falling import prices are more likely to pursue an investigation, and industries that are more susceptible to cyclical dumping due to greater capital investment expenditures and that face rapidly increasing competition from imports receive greater antidumping protection.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Bown, Chad P.
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-09
Subjects:	AD VALOREM, ANTIDUMPING, ANTIDUMPING CODE, ANTIDUMPING DATABASE, ANTIDUMPING LAWS, ANTIDUMPING MEASURES, ANTIDUMPING POLICY, ANTIDUMPING PROCESS, ANTIDUMPING RULES, BENCHMARK, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, CAPITAL INVESTMENT, CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, COLLUSION, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, COMPETITION POLICY, CONSTRUCTION, CONSUMER PREFERENCES, CONTRACTING PARTIES, CUMULATIVE EFFECTS, CURRENCY, DEMAND ELASTICITIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES, DOMESTIC ANTIDUMPING LAW, DOMESTIC AUTHORITIES, DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES, DOMESTIC INDUSTRY, DOMESTIC MARKET, DOMESTIC PRICES, DUMPED IMPORTS, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC WELFARE, ECONOMICS RESEARCH, EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS, EXCHANGE RATE, EXPORT PRICE, EXPORT SALES, EXPORT VALUE, EXPORTERS, EXPORTING COUNTRIES, EXPORTS, FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, FIXED COSTS, FOREIGN COMPETITION, FOREIGN EXPORTERS, FOREIGN FIRM, FORMAL ANALYSIS, FREE RIDER, FREE RIDER PROBLEM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, HOME MARKET, IMPORT COMPETITION, IMPORT PENETRATION, IMPORT PRICES, IMPORT PROTECTION, IMPORT RESTRICTION, IMPORT RESTRICTIONS, IMPORT VALUE, IMPORTED PRODUCTS, IMPORTING COUNTRIES, INDUSTRIAL USE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM, INVENTORIES, INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY, ITC, LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS, MARGINAL EFFECTS, MARKET SHARE, MATERIAL INJURY, NATIONAL ANTIDUMPING LAWS, NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, NATIONAL AUTHORITY, NON-TARIFF BARRIERS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, PRICE UNDERTAKING, REAL EXCHANGE RATES, REAL GDP, TARIFF BARRIERS, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE POLICIES, TRADE POLICY, TRADE RESTRICTION, TRADE RESTRICTIONS, VALUE ADDED, VALUE OF IMPORTS, WAGES, WORLD TRADE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/09/7071163/world-trade-organization-antidumping-developing-countries https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9305
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