Takeover Laws and Financial Development

The issue of "an appropriate" legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a comparative context across 50 countries. It proposes a methodology to create a detailed index on the most salient features of capital market laws, and illustrates the approach on the case of takeover legislation. The methodology allows better understanding of the impact of laws on markets and development, allows a detailed quantification of a given regulation, in this case takeover market rules, and helps determine relevant policy implications. Specifically, the framework permits the exploration of the effects of individual regulations, their substitutability and interplay, as well as the overall extent of friendliness of the laws to investors, or particular groups thereof (such as minority shareholders), and the links of specialized regulation with the overall legal system. Finally, the study explores the effect of the investor-friendliness of takeover laws on stock market development.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Nenova, Tatiana
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-10
Subjects:	ACQUISITION, ACQUISITIONS, ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES, ANTI-TAKEOVER TACTICS, APPRAISAL RIGHT, APPRAISAL RIGHTS, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, ASSET SALES, BANKRUPTCY, BANKS, BIDDERS, BONDS, BOOK VALUE, CAPITAL MARKET, CAPITAL MARKETS, CHARTER, COMPANY, COMPANY MANAGEMENT, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CONTROL, CONTROL TRANSACTIONS, CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER, CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE DECISION, CORPORATE DECISIONS, CORPORATE DEFENSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE RAIDER, CORPORATE REGULATIONS, CORPORATE VALUE, CORPORATION, DEBT, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, DIRECTOR LIABILITY, DISCLOSURE, DISCLOSURE RULES, DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS, DIVERSIFICATION, DIVIDENDS, EMERGING MARKETS, EQUAL TREATMENT, EQUITY CAPITAL, EXPROPRIATION, EXTERNAL FINANCING, FAIR, FIDUCIARY DUTIES, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, FINANCIAL MARKET, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FIRMS, FOREIGN INVESTORS, GOING PRIVATE, GOLDEN PARACHUTES, GOLDEN SHARES, HOSTILE BIDS, HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, INVESTMENT COMPANIES, INVESTOR PROTECTION, LARGE SHAREHOLDER, LIMITED, MANAGERS, MARKET DEVELOPMENT, MARKET PRICE, MARKET PRICES, MARKET TRADING, MARKET VALUE, MARKETING, MEMBER STATES, MERGER, MERGERS, MINORITY INTERESTS, MINORITY INVESTORS, MINORITY SHAREHOLDER, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, OWNERSHIP, OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES, PAC, POISON PILL, POISON PILLS, PORTFOLIO, POTENTIAL ACQUIRER, PRIVATE COMPANY, PROTECTION OF INVESTOR, PROXY, PUBLIC COMPANIES, PUBLIC COMPANY, PURCHASING, PYRAMID OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERS, RISK EXPOSURE, SALE, SECURITIES LAW, SECURITIES LAWS, SECURITIES REGULATOR, SHARE OWNERSHIP, SHAREHOLDER, SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS, SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL, SHAREHOLDER MEETING, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS, SHAREHOLDING, STOCK EXCHANGE, STOCK MARKET, STOCK MARKETS, SUBSIDIARIES, TAKEOVER, TAKEOVER BID, TAKEOVER LAW, TAKEOVER LAWS, TAKEOVER LEGISLATION, TAKEOVER MECHANISMS, TAKEOVER REGULATION, TAKEOVER REGULATIONS, TAKEOVER THREAT, TAKEOVERS, TARGET BOARD, TARGET COMPANY, TARGET SHAREHOLDERS, TENDER OFFER, TENDER OFFERS, TENDERING, TENDERS, TRANSPARENCY, VALUATION, VENTURE CAPITAL, VENTURE CAPITAL FIRM, VOTING SHARES, WEALTH,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/10/7112008/takeover-laws-financial-development https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9003
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