Cooperative Game Theory and its Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues : 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources

This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Zara, Stefano, Dinar, Ariel, Patrone, Fioravante
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-11
Subjects:	ACID RAIN, APPROPRIATION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, BIOLOGICAL MODELS, BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITY, BIOMASS, COASTAL AREA, COASTAL STATE, CONSUMER PREFERENCES, CONSUMERS, COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM, COST FUNCTIONS, CPR, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DISCOUNT RATE, ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMIC VALUE, ECONOMICS, ECONOMICS RESEARCH, ECONOMISTS, ECOSYSTEM, EMISSIONS, ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES, EQUILIBRIA, EQUILIBRIUM, EXCLUDABILITY, EXPLOITATION, EXTERNALITIES, FISH, FISH PRODUCTS, FISH RESOURCES, FISH STOCKS, FISHERIES, FISHERIES ISSUES, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, FISHERIES SECTOR, FISHERY, FISHERY MANAGEMENT, FISHERY RESOURCES, FISHERY STATISTICS, FISHES, FISHING, FISHING EFFORT, FISHING GEAR, FISHING UNITS, FOREST, FOREST MANAGEMENT, FORESTS, FREE RIDER, FREE RIDER PROBLEM, GAME THEORY, HIGH SEAS, HIGH SEAS FISHERIES, MARKET MECHANISM, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, NATURAL RESOURCES, NATURE, OPEN ACCESS, POLLUTANTS, POLLUTION, POPULATION DYNAMICS, PRESENT VALUE, PRIVATE GOODS, PRODUCTIVITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, QUOTAS, RENEWABLE RESOURCE, SEA, SEAS, SIDE PAYMENTS, SOLE, SPECIES, STOCK LEVEL, SUBTRACTABILITY, SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT, TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH, TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, TRANSFER PAYMENTS, TUNA, WATER RESOURCE, WATER RESOURCES, WHALES, WHALING,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/11/7216750/cooperative-game-theory-application-natural-environmental-water-resource-issues-2-application-natural-environmental-resources https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850
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