Geographic Inequity in a Decentralized Anti-Poverty Program : A Case Study of China

The central governments of many developing countries have chosen to decentralize their anti-poverty programs, in the expectation that local agents are better informed about local needs. The paper shows that this potential advantage of decentralized eligibility criteria can come at a large cost, to the extent that the induced geographic inequities undermine performance in reaching the income- poor nationally. These issues are studied empirically for (probably) the largest transfer-based poverty program in the world, namely China's Di Bao program, which aims to assure a minimum income through means-tested transfers. Poor municipalities are found to adopt systematically lower eligibility thresholds, reducing the program's ability to reach poor areas, and generating considerable horizontal inequity.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ravallion, Martin
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2007-08
Subjects:ABSOLUTE POVERTY, ABSOLUTE VALUE, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, ADMINISTRATIVE DATA, AMOUNT OF INCOME, ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMS, BASIC NEEDS, BENEFICIARIES, BENEFICIARY, CALCULATION, CASH TRANSFERS, CENTRAL PLANNING, COMMUNITY GROUPS, COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, CONSUMER, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, DATA REQUIREMENTS, DATA SET, DATA SETS, DECENTRALIZATION, DEFLATORS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DIMINISHING RETURNS, DISABILITY, DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC POLICY, ECONOMIC REVIEW, ECONOMICS RESEARCH, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, EXPLANATORY POWER, FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, FISCAL CONSTRAINTS, FIXED COST, FUNCTIONAL FORMS, GDP, GROSS INCOME, HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HOUSEHOLD INCOMES, IMPERFECT INFORMATION, INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME EFFECT, INCOME ELASTICITY, INCOME LEVEL, INCOME SHARE, INEQUALITY, INTERVENTION, LACK OF INFORMATION, LIVING STANDARDS, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, LOCAL POVERTY, LOCAL POVERTY LINE, LOG INCOME, LONGITUDINAL DATA, LOWER INCOME, MEAN INCOME, MEAN INCOMES, MEASUREMENT ERRORS, NATIONAL SURVEYS, NEGOTIATION, NEW POOR, NORMAL DISTRIBUTION, NORMAL GOOD, PARTICIPATION RATES, POLICY DISCUSSIONS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, POOR, POOR AREAS, POOR PEOPLE, POPULATION SHARE, POSITIVE CORRELATION, POVERTY GAP, POVERTY GAP INDEX, POVERTY IMPACT, POVERTY LINE, POVERTY LINES, POVERTY PROBLEM, POVERTY RATE, POVERTY RATES, POVERTY REDUCTION, PROBABILITY, PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC PROGRAMS, PUBLIC SPENDING, QUESTIONNAIRE, REAL INCOME, REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT, REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES, REDUCING POVERTY, REGIONAL INEQUALITY, RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION, RELATIVE POVERTY, RISING INCOME INEQUALITY, SAMPLE SIZE, SELECTION BIAS, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL PROTECTION, SOCIAL SERVICES, SOCIAL SPENDING, STATE TAXES, TARGETED TRANSFERS, TARGETING, TAXATION, UNDERESTIMATES, WAGES,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8042377/geographic-inequity-decentralized-anti-poverty-program-case-study-china
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7499
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