Corruption and Concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin America
Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions.
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
| Language: | EN |
| Published: |
2009
|
| Subjects: | Bureaucracy, Administrative Processes in Public Organizations, Corruption D730, Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420, Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920, Gas Utilities, Pipelines, Water Utilities L950, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements O170, Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses, Transportation O180, |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5804 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|