Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia
The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s-early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
| Language: | EN |
| Published: |
2009
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| Subjects: | Intergovernmental Relations, Federalism, Secession H770, Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics P250, Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics P350, Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, and Changes R110, |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/5748 |
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