Legislative Malapportionment and Institutional Persistence

This paper argues that legislative malapportionment, denoting a discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts, serves as a tool for pre-democratic elites to preserve their political power and economic interests after a transition to democracy. The authors claim that legislative malapportionment enhances the pre-democratic elite s political influence by over-representing areas that are more likely to vote for parties aligned with the elite. This biased political representation survives in equilibrium as long as it helps democratic consolidation. Using data from Latin America, the authors document empirically that malapportionment increases the probability of transitioning to a democracy. Moreover, the data show that over-represented electoral districts are more likely to vote for parties close to pre-democracy ruling groups. The analysis also finds that overrepresented areas have lower levels of political competition and receive more transfers per capita from the central government, both of which favor the persistence of power of pre-democracy elites.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bruhn, Miriam, Gallego, Francisco, Onorato, Massimiliano
Language:English
Published: 2010-11-01
Subjects:ALLOCATION, BARGAINING, BARGAINING POWER, BICAMERAL SYSTEM, BOND, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, COUNTRY FIXED EFFECT, COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS, COUNTRY RISK, COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, DEMOCRATIC STATE, DEMOGRAPHIC, DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES, DICTATORSHIP, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC HISTORY, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC POWER, ECONOMICS, ELECTION, ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL SYSTEM, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, EMPLOYMENT, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, GDP, GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTITUENCIES, INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATORS, LEGITIMACY, LOBBYING, LOWER HOUSE, LOWER HOUSES, MACROECONOMICS, MOTIVATION, OUTPUT, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, PATRONAGE, PEACE, PLEBISCITE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL GROUPS, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTY, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL REGIME, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL SUPPORT, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICIES, RENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, REPUBLIC, RIGHT TO VOTE, VOTING, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, WORLD ECONOMIES, WORLD ECONOMY,
Online Access:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101102132755
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3948
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