Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries : A Review of the Literature

This paper reviews the literature on tax assignment in decentralized countries. Ideally, own-source revenues should be sufficient to enable at least the richest subnational governments to finance from their own resources all locally-provided services that primarily benefit local residents. Subnational taxes should also not unduly distort the allocation of resources. Most importantly, to the extent possible subnational governments should be accountable at the margin for financing the expenditures for which they are responsible. Although reality in most countries inevitably falls far short of these ideals, nonetheless there are several taxes that subnational governments in developing countries could use to help ensure that decentralization yields more of the benefits it appears to promise in theory. At the local level, such taxes include property taxes and, especially for larger cities, perhaps also a limited and well-designed local business tax. At the regional level, in addition to taxes on vehicles, governments in some countries may be able to utilize any or all of the following -- a payroll tax; a simple surcharge on the central personal income tax; and a sales tax, in some cases perhaps taking the form of a well-designed regional value-added tax. The "best" package for any particular country or subnational government is likely to be not only context-specific and path-dependent, but also highly sensitive to the balance struck between different political and economic factors and interests.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Bird, Richard M.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English
Published:	2010-10-01
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING, ADDED TAX, ADDED TAXES, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, BENEFICIARIES, BETTERMENT CHARGES, BORROWING, BUDGET CONSTRAINT, BUSINESS TAX, BUSINESS TAXES, CAPITAL FLOWS, CAPITAL INVESTMENT, CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, CAPITALS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, CENTRAL REVENUES, CENTRAL TAXES, CENTRAL TRANSFERS, CENTRALIZING, CITIES, COASTAL PROVINCES, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, COMPLIANCE COSTS, CONSUMPTION TAX, CONSUMPTION TAXES, CORPORATE INCOME TAX, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, DEBT, DECENTRALIZATION, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DIFFERENTIALS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES, EQUALIZATION, EXCISE TAXES, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT, EXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATION, EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES, EXPENDITURES, EXPORTERS, FEDERAL COUNTRIES, FEDERAL COUNTRY, FEDERAL TAX, FEDERALISM, FINANCES, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FISCAL AUTONOMY, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL DISCIPLINE, FISCAL FEDERALISM, FISCAL INSTITUTIONS, FISCAL REFORMS, FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY, FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY, GOVERNORS, IMMOVABLE PROPERTY, INCOME TAXES, INEFFICIENT TAX, INFLATION, INSTRUMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FINANCE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL, INVESTMENT DECISIONS, LAND USE, LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, LEVIES, LEVY, LICENSES, LOAN, LOCAL AUTONOMY, LOCAL BUSINESS, LOCAL CAPACITIES, LOCAL CAPACITY, LOCAL EXPENDITURES, LOCAL FINANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES, LOCAL REVENUE, LOCAL SPENDING, LOCAL TAXATION, LOCAL TAXES, MACROECONOMIC CONTROL, MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES, MACROECONOMIC PROBLEMS, MAYORS, MONETARY FUND, NATIONAL TAXES, NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES, PAYROLL TAX, PAYROLL TAXES, PERSONAL INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME TAX, PERSONAL INCOME TAXES, POLICY ANALYSIS, POLICY CHOICES, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLICY PROCESS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL STABILITY, PORTFOLIO, PRIVATE SECTOR, PROPERTY OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY TAX, PROPERTY TAXES, PROVINCE, PROVINCES, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, PROVINCIAL SALES, PROVINCIAL SALES TAXES, PROVINCIAL TAXES, PUBLIC, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, PUBLIC REVENUES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SPENDING, REAL PROPERTY, REAL PROPERTY TAX, REAL PROPERTY TAXES, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, RETURNS, REVENUE ADEQUACY, REVENUE ASSIGNMENT, REVENUE ASSIGNMENTS, REVENUE COLLECTIONS, REVENUE MOBILIZATION, REVENUE SHARING, REVENUE SOURCES, SALES TAX, SALES TAXES, SMALL TOWNS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, STREETS, SUBNATIONAL, SUBNATIONAL AUTHORITIES, SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURES, SUBNATIONAL FINANCE, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, SUBNATIONAL UNITS, TAX, TAX ADMINISTRATION, TAX ASSIGNMENT, TAX AUTHORITY, TAX AUTONOMY, TAX BASE, TAX BASES, TAX BURDEN, TAX COMPETITION, TAX COMPLIANCE, TAX DECENTRALIZATION, TAX DIFFERENTIALS, TAX EXPORTING, TAX MEASURES, TAX OFFICIALS, TAX RATE, TAX RATES, TAX REVENUE, TAX REVENUES, TAX SHARING, TAX SHARING ARRANGEMENTS, TAX STRUCTURE, TAX SYSTEM, TAX TABLE, TAXATION, TAXES ON PROPERTY, TAXPAYERS, TRANSPARENCY, USER CHARGES, VALUATION,
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101019161844 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3933
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